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Thursday, 26 January 2017

Like father, like son; Okello Oryem acts swine - #Uganda #31years


Around October 2005, Museveni reaffirmed his earlier assertion that past leaders of Uganda were swines.  He insisted that the best description befitting Uganda's past leaders is that of a 'swine'.
"Though I got into trouble with the word (swines), I am going to quote it again for this occasion.  'Give not that which is holly to the dogs, neither cast your pearls before swines lest they trample them under their feet and turn again and rend you.'"

Hon. Okello Oryem is Museveni's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and son to former President Gen. Tito Okello Lutwa (July 1985 – Jan 1986).  Gen. Tito Okello had reigned over the UNLA as the army chief when it was battling the Museveni led NRA.  In July 1985 he led the Acholi faction of the army that overthrew President Milton Obote.

In late 1985 Museveni lured him into the Nairobi Peace Talks just as a tactic to kick him out of power.  Indeed, in January 1986, his NRA dislodged the UNLA and took over power.  As Gen. Okello fled to exile his UNLA was disbanded.  However, owing to the reprisal mistreatment that the victorious NRA netted out on the Acholi community, former soldiers regrouped into a self-defence uprising that gave rise to the northern Uganda insurgency.

As a counter insurgency measure, Museveni moved to lure Gen. Tito Okello back from exile.  He did return to Uganda and died at home but the rebellion continued.  Museveni took another gamble at winning over the Acholis by appointing Gen. Okello's son as Minister of State for Foreign Affairs - a position he has held for over a decade.  Although Oryem played some role in the LRA peace process, his appointment to the foreign affairs docked was aimed at giving him access to the Acholis in the diaspora.

His tenure at the ministry has not been a bed of rosses.  Owing to his being denied adequate information by the regime insiders, he has on several occasions made controversial and embarrassing public statements on national issues.  Just last week, the DRC government revealed that about 200 members of the former M23 rebel group had re-entered eastern Congo from Uganda.  Following their defeat by an African Union force in 2013, M23 fled to Uganda where the government took custody of them.  Minister Oryem acting out of excitement and ignorance hastly denied the allegation.  

He instead accused the DRC government of trying to shift public attention from the political crisis in Kinshasha.  "We know there are problems in Kinshasha but they (government) should not use Uganda as an excuse intended to divert attention from increasing pressure on President Kabila who is trying to fend off mounting opposition to his decision to stay beyond his mandate which expired last month."

The following day the Kampala regime issued an official statement acknowledging that the former M23 rebels had disappeared from their encampment in a military barracks.  The regime Media Centre went ahead to disclose that over one hundred of them had been intercepted at the Uganda/Congo border.  Since then scores of these combatants and caches of arms have been intercepted.  

With these developments, Minister Oryem went back and swallowed his 'vomit' thus: "I don’t know and I don’t care if rebels were missing from camps.  We never wanted them here, we never invited them here, they are not even desirable in Uganda.  The responsibility of M23 was squarely with the government of the DRC and UN squarely with them and not the government of Uganda."


Minister Okello should stick to his mandate of realigning Acholis towards the Museveni regime.  Some of these things don’t concern him and are kept secret from 'swines' lest them trample them under their feet.  

In 1990 when Museveni dispatched the Rwandese Tutsis from his army to invade Rwanda, he claimed they had escaped.  He even went ahead to pretend to that he was arresting road-blocks to stop others and the rest is history.  Otherwise, Okello Oryem should prepare for more humiliation as the eastern Congo insurgency resumes.

Museveni has gone ahead to collect the offspring of past leaders and horde them into a pigsty from where he feeds them on left-overs.

INFORMATION IS POWER AND DEFIANCE IS THE WAY TO GO

http://changeofguards.blogspot.ca/2017/01/like-father-like-son-okello-oryem-acts.html

How honesty has cost Brig. Balya - #Uganda


Museveni has fired his Director General of Internal Security Organisation (DG/ISO), Brig. Ronnie Balya. Just last week, we ran an article tittled:  "MUSEVENI'S INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY" in which we predicted that Brig. Balya was to be fired soon. 


We laid bare his charge sheet thus: being honest, courageous and rising issues in the 'wrong forum'.  Late last year while presenting a paper at the regime retreat at the Kyankwanzi shrines, he warned that corruption was at the verge of making the regime to fall.  Shortly after the same Brigadier while appearing before the parliamentary committee on Defence and Internal Affairs disclosed that his organisation (ISO) was in a sorry state in terms of logistical and financial facilitation.

Corruption is the regime's lifeline in that it buys loyalty and lures fence sitters.  For some years now, Museveni has been undermining ISO because he feels its personnel are outdated and opposition leaning.  Obviously Balya had been privately briefing Museveni on the above issues thus by the time he opted to go public he had had satisfied himself that Museveni would never positively act.

In the same article we also mentioned the little known Maj. Kaka Bagenda who is now replacing Brig. Balya.  Kaka fought the bush war having joined the NRA from Kayiira's UFM upon defection.  As a one
time Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) in the bush, he played a key role.  He is mostly remembered for among other critical missions effectively carrying out a reconnaissance on Masindi barracks that the
NRA successfully attacked in 1984.  The huge cache of arms that were got from Masindi gave the Bush War a major positive turning point.

After capturing power, he became the NRA's Director of Transport – a position he held until the early 1990s when he quit military service. He quit under the World Bank Imposed Reduction-In-Force (RIF) first phase.  His departure was a big surprise to everyone more especially at a time when the so called vanguards of the struggle were entering a phase of self-rewarding.  As usual he was branded 'disgruntled' and subjected to intelligence monitoring.  Obviously his departure must have been in protest of the systematic sidelining and discriminatory tendencies that were characterising management of the military.  He had witnessed the purging of his bush war colleagues like Kanyankole, Matovu, Chihandae, Kashilingi not to mention the former UFM fighters.

Since then he has been living a quiet life in Kalangala, Ssese Islands.  However, Museveni must have been monitoring him through some simple clandestine missions.  Though he had served under the
intelligence community during the bush war, the conditions have tremendously changed owing to change in political terrain and technological advancements.  He will find a lot of difficulty to adjust to new dynamics.  His appointment has more to do with mobilisation and monitoring of war veterans in central region than mainstream intelligence management.  Therefore, Museveni has no will to rejuvenate the ISO to realise its core value.

On the other hand, Brig. Balya's appointment to the position of Ambassador to an unnamed country is just to console him and hoodwink the public.  Remember the former Deputy Army chief. Gen. Ivan Koreta was also relieved and promised a similar position three years ago but to date nothing is forthcoming.  Balya belongs to the club of individuals 'pepper tiger Generals' whom Museveni deliberately kept away from military training and exposure to command positions but kept
awarding them disproportionate top ranks.  

Gen. Otafiire, Brig. Kategaya, Brig. Mayombo, Col.  Mushega, Col. Butime and other Generals that cannot even command a platoon of 36 soldiers which is ordinarily commanded by a Lieutenant in the army.  Being a Mutooro, Brig. Balya must have not accumulated ill-gotten wealth for himself.  That is why he has not been implicated in anything like land grabbing, smuggling, drug trafficking and gross abuse of human rights.  He has nursed some long time ailments and is likely to suffer depression and the cost of drugs once he is left on Katebe (redundant) for long. During his term in office he has executed major political missions for Museveni but little did he know that he was all along riding on a Tiger's back.

INFORMATION IS POWER AND DEFIANCE IS THE WAY TO GO!
http://changeofguards.blogspot.ca/2017/01/how-honesty-has-cost-brig-balya-uganda.html

Sunday, 22 January 2017

Who will stop this carnage in #Uganda #prisons?




Mid this week four inmates were killed in a road accident along FortPortal - Kamwenge Road just four kms from FortPortal town. Several other inmates and Prison Warders sustained serious injuries.

The prisoners from Katojo Prison who were being transported on a private Mitsubish pick-up vehicle number UAE 234 were going to work on a private farm in Gweri village.
In September 2016, in Ibanda, one prisoner died on the spot and 21 others when a private vehicle they were travelling in overturned along the Ibanda - Kamwenge road.  The prisoners from Nyabuhikye Prison were being taken to work on a private farm in Bisheshe.  The accident was blamed on the drunk driver.
In May 2016, 19 prisoners were critically injured and one Prison Warder died on the spot in a road accident along the Kyotera-Kabira Road in Rakai district.  The prisoners from Kalisizo Prison were being transported on a private truck to work on a private farm.

In July 2014, five prisoners died on the spot and several were injured in a motor accident along the Kabwohe-Ishaka road in Shema district. The 45 prisoners and four Prison Warders were being transported in a private FUSO lorry as they returned from working on private farms.
In October 2011, one prisoner died on the spot while two Prison Warders and eleven prisoners were seriously injured in a road accident.  Their over speeding private pickup truck, UAN 3935 carrying 15 people overturned at Kyetume along the Masaka - Mbarara Road.  They were from Lwengo Prison and were heading to Kyabusolo village to work on a private farm.
In March 2005, one 60 years old prisoner died on the spot and another 20 were seriously injured around Kagote Housing Estate within FortPortal town when the private lorry they were travelling in overturned while on its way to a private farm.
Reports of gross abuse of prisoners' human rights have been repeatedly highlighted over the years but the regime is adamant.  Prisoners are detained without trials, are tortured and in some instances killed

Court have carried out inquests in deaths in prison but we are yet to see anyone held accountable.  The welfare and living conditions of prisoners in the country is appalling. Instead, the regime is busy making manoeuvres to privatise the Prison Services the same way it has done with the Army, Police and the intelligence services.  Recently the parliamentary committee on Defence and Internal Affairs presented made a country wide tour of prison facilities.  Just this week it presented its report to the Speaker in which its mainly highlighting issues of congestion and overcrowding which it blames on the Judiciary. 
It points out that the 209 inmates who have been on death row for many years are contributing to overcrowding. This is a very unfortunate observation by such a committee.
Imagine private individuals paying prison officers for free labour by prisoners.  The same individual provides transport which causes accidents and inmates are killed and maimed.  The other day Prison vehicles were involved in evacuating traders from South Sudan yet private cars in poor mechanical condition are used to transport prisoners in some parts of the country. The prisoners earn only 100 shillings for skilled labour, 200 shillings for semi-skilled labour and 500 shillings for skilled labour rendered.

Prisons are supposed to be safe places for prisoners but imagine your loved one who is serving a sentence and looking forward to returning home but is instead killed in a stupid way.  Imagine you are held in dilapidated building and fire breaks out; did the honourable Members of Parliament ascertain if there are fire fighting equipment in prisons?  Prisons have no windows and are only locked from outside; what evacuation measures are in place in the event of fire?  What about the over speeding special prison vehicles that certain classes of prisoners between court and prison?  Imagine getting involved in a motor accident when your hands are hand-cuffed or two prisoners are jointly hand-cuffed!  REMEMBER, EVERYONE IS A POTENTIAL PRISONER.  The Commissioner General of Prisons or even his deputy can at one time become inmates the same way it is for any other Ugandan regardless of status.
INFORMATION IS POWER AND DEFIANCE IS THE WAY TO GO.

http://changeofguards.blogspot.ca/2017/01/who-will-stop-this-carnage-in-uganda.html

Friday, 20 January 2017

What is legal status of former #M23 rebels in #Uganda?


First published December 16, 2014

Defeated M23 - a Museveni's reserve force
At the height of the M23 rebellion in eastern DRC the UN alleged that the Uganda government was rendering support to the militants. Uganda government reacted by rubbishing off the UN report before threatening to pull out its troops from Somalia. When the UN Brigade defeated the M23 in eastern DRC, Uganda offered sanctuary to the defeated rebels including their top military and political leaders. The government claimed that it had disarmed the defeated militants before harbouring them at Bihanga military barracks under the guard/protection of the NRA.

 M23 defeat splits EAC
The defeat of M23 by the UN Brigade that was comprised among two others of Tanzania troops did not go well for both Kigali and Kampala. It resulted in the isolation of Tanzania from the East African Community (EAC) through the creation of the Museveni engineered Coalition of the Willing comprising of Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda.

Nairobi declaration
Early in 2014, the government of DRC and the former M23 movement signed a Declaration of Surrender in Nairobi in which among other issues, the government of DRC was to grant amnesty to these militants. The DRC government also committed itself to the process of expediting the return of Congolese refugees to their country from neighboring countries. Around May 2014 some of these former M23 militants signed amnesty forms at Bihanga Barracks in Bihanga. The UN once again issued another report that linked the M23 militants to the fighting in South Sudan alongside the NRA. The Museveni government as usual vehemently rejected the report describing it as rubbish.

Efforts to return Sam Mugumya
There has been some improvement in relationship between Uganda and DRC following the successful attacks against the ADF by the DRC army in its eastern region. However, the presence of two Ugandan dissident politicians (Kipoi and Sam Mugumya) in Kinshansha is softening Uganda's stand on M23. Since the two countries have no extradition treaties, DRC has been reluctant to hand back the two to Uganda. There has been behind the scenes negotiations between the two governments. Museveni desperately needs the return of Mugumya and group so as to use them to corner Dr. Besigye by fabricating treasonous allegations.

Forceful return to DRC
As part of the deal, a high powered delegation from the DRC government has been in Uganda since last week over the return to DRC of the former M23 militants. Last week, the M23 political leader Bisiimwa protested over what he termed as forced repatriation of the former militants by writing to the UN Human rights office. The said protest did not deter the arrangement; today Uganda government was set to dispatch the first consignment of 120 of these militants back to the DRC.

Brig. Makenga escapes
About 800 (a battalion) of the former M23 militants led by Brig. Sultan Makenga are reported to have escaped fro the Bihanga military barracks to Rwamwanja Refugee Camp and reported to the UNHCR. How can 800 former militants manage to escape from a military camp in Ibanda and report to an equally guarded refugee camp in Rwamwanja in Kyenjojo district. The distance in between is over 60 kms and with natural obstacles in between like the River Katonga and Katonga wildlife reserve. This is a Museveni ploy to dupe the DRC government.


Legal status
Initially it was wrong for Museveni to harbour these former militias in a Military barracks unless they were part of his army or he intended to rearm them for re-invading the DRC. After being disarmed, they should have been handed over to the ICRC for further management and if there were those who wished to seek asylum in Uganda, the law is very clear. It would have been the government of Uganda to invite the UNHCR to offer humanitarian assistance to those who would have opted to seek asylum. 

After spending one year in a military camp under the host government, these militants do not qualify for refugee status consideration under the UNHCR statute unless they proved that they had been detained in the military camp. Since they have never renounced rebellion, they face exclusion under the UN refugee status determination procedures because they are still regarded as militants who have not renounced rebellion.

DRC duped
As to whether the government of DRC will succumb to this Museveni hypocrisy, we are yet to see. Remember when Rwandese soldiers the NRA left to attack Rwanda in 1990, Museveni claimed that they had escaped.

Oh Uganda!!!!!

INFORMATION IS POWER

http://changeofguards.blogspot.ca/2017/01/what-is-legal-status-of-former-m23.html

Behind new #Museveni regional security pact - #Uganda


First published December 10, 2014

For the first time last week Museveni's own NRM caucus (defacto parliament) questioned the intention of a new Mutual Peace and Security Pact that does not include the Tanzania and Burundi; other two East African Community members.  Shortly after the Minister of Defence presented it to the floor of parliament for ratification whereupon the Speaker referred it to the Defence and Internal Affairs committee for scrutiny. The unusual behavior of the rubber stamp caucus was prompted by the current split in political support for Museveni.

The Mutual Peace and Security Pact is a product of a Memorandum of Understanding between Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda on "collective measures taken by the partner states to ensure peace and security including combating cross border crime, counter terrorism, transnational crimes, and management of disaster among states."

Museveni has been at the forefront of fast tracking of the East African Community (EAC) political integration in the hope that he becomes the first President of the federation but more so to secure a regional military alliance that will guarantee his life presidency scheme. Initially one of the core provisions of the earlier much craved for EAC Defence Pact had been "An attack on a member state shall be an attack on all member states. An attack on a party state shall be considered a threat on regional security. 

Such an attack shall be met with immediate collective action by all state parties." Tanzania opposed this provision and it negatively impacted on Museveni's schemes. The situation was worsened by Tanzania deploying its troops into eastern DRC to flush out the Rwanda and Uganda backed M23 rebellion. Tanzania went ahead and signed the EAC Defence Pact that did not have that ambiguous provision. This Defence pact has since been rendered redundant since it does not serve Museveni's personal interest.  

http://changeofguards.blogspot.ca/2017/01/behind-new-museveni-regional-security.html

Read more on; changeofguards.blogspot.ca/EAC military alliance - Museveni's major stake).


Instead, Museveni went ahead to scheme for the Coalition of the Willing (COW) to include Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda and excluded Tanzania and Burundi. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed for fast tracking the political integration in Kigali in October 2013. COW went ahead to roll out major infrastructure projects like the Mombasa - Kampala - Kigali railway line, South Sudan - Kampala - Kenya oil pipeline, oil refinery in Uganda etc. 

Under COW, the three partner states have gone ahead to put in place a single tourist visa, custom authority, use of national IDs to replace travel documents within the three partner states. Under the same arrangement Museveni came up with the idea of a Mutual Peace and Security Pact to cover the three countries excluding Tanzania and Burundi.

COW affairs are handled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs unlike the EAC affairs which are handled by the EAC secretariat. Therefore, the current COW's Mutual Peace and Security Pact is a Museveni desperate ploy whose ratification he is trying to rush in order to be able to confront the impending tough times ahead. 

The pact will allow Rwanda's and Kenya’s security forces to intervene in Uganda's internal affairs within a few minutes of notification. Likewise, Uganda's security forces will do the same in Kenya and Rwanda. The intoxicated Mutual Peace and Security Pact under COW is different from the sober Defence Pact under the EAC.  The Uganda parliament should as much as possible reject the ratification of this pact since it does not serve the citizens of the three countries but is meant to guarantee the leader's life Presidency schemes.

INFORMATION IS POWER


#EAC military alliance - #Museveni's major stake #Uganda



First published on September 17, 2013

Had the original East African Community (EAC) not collapsed in 1977, Tanzania would not have invaded Uganda to overthrow Iddi Amin in. Rwanda, Burundi and Congo too all along had in place a similar arrangement that preceded the current International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). Their original regional arrangement had its secretariat based in Goma.

That regional body was a success story because it successfully resolved any misunderstanding that arose between any state party. It managed to contain any attempt by Rwandese Tutsis exiled in Congo and Burundi from any hostile activities against the Hutu government in Rwanda. Similarly, the same body contained Burundi Hutus who were exiled in Rwanda from any hostility against the Tutsi government in Burundi.

That way, the hostility that ignited that region's bloody conflict had to come from outside the regional arrangement - Uganda. In 1990 the Rwandese Tutsis from Uganda invaded Rwanda and the long time constrained Rwandese Tutsis in Congo and Burundi flocked Uganda to join hands with RPF. In 1993, Burundi got the first democratically elected Hutu President but was slaughtered by the Tutsi army three months later. A Hutu had taken over power in Burundi at a time when the Tutsi RPF was battling the Hutu government of Rwanda.

Had he not been slaughtered and power reverted back to the Tutsi army, the then Hutu government of Rwanda would have got a strong ally in Burundi thus strengthening its resistance against the RPF. With the pro-Uganda RPF taking over power in Rwanda in 1994, that regional body collapsed. The final nail was hardly two years later when the RPF invaded Congo and overthrew Mobutu.

Museveni had all along envied that body but also feared that his presidency would be challenged from Congo. That is why just a few hours after being sworn in as President in 1986, he flew to Congo to meet Congo’s Mobutu, Rwanda's Habyarimana and Kenya's Arap Moi. He wanted that regional body to be expanded to include Uganda and Kenya in order to secure a regional military alliance. Kenya had since the time of Iddi Amin harboured Ugandan dissidents. During the Obote II regime Kenya was the major base of the NRA external operations.

After Museveni took over power, still Kenya was a base of Uganda dissidents. Around 1997, an all out war was about to break out after the NRA made an incursion into Kenya. Dissident Ugandan Amon Bazira was shot dead in Nairobi by ESO operatives. In early 1990s Kenyan dissident Col Odong who had formed the February Eighteenth Resistance Army (FERA) was a state guest in Kampala and handled by Aronda before relocating to Ghana. During the controversial elections in Kenya Museveni was opposed to the Raila Odinga victory for fear that the latter’s government would ally with the Nilotic/Luos in Uganda.

He had supported the SPLA in Southern Sudan but intelligence reports indicated that that it often supplied LRA with logistics and intelligence. Museveni's main fear was that once John Garang had secured Southern Sudan's independence, he could seek to support his cousins in Northern Uganda. John Garang died in a Ugandan Helicopter crash shortly before the country’s independence.

In advocating for the fast tracking of the EAC political federation, Museveni seeks to secure a military alliance that will guarantee his stay in power. To this end he sough to include a provision in the defence pact thus "an attack on a member state shall be an attack against all member states. An armed attack against a party state party shall be considered a threat to regional security. Such an attack shall be met with immediate collective action by all state parties".

This provision was defeated by Tanzania prompting Museveni to lower his tone on his much acclaimed EAC Stand by Brigade and instead concentrate on strengthening his son's SFG. Another interest lies in attaining the first Presidency of the EAC federation so that he hands over Uganda's Presidency to his chosen successor. That is why he opposed Gadhafi on the idea of African Union. With Tanzania's reluctance to fast track the EAC federation coupled by pressure to relinquish the presidency in Uganda, Museveni is desperately trying to secure a faster regional federation without Tanzania. In his calculation, if he already has the support of Rwanda, Kenya and South Sudan. In future he expects to bring on board Somalia and the yet to be created state of Kivu in eastern DRC.


Therefore, Tanzania's deployment into DRC against Rwanda/Uganda backed M23 was a fatal blow to Museveni's schemes. The situation is worsened by recent expulsion of Rwandese from Tanzania. To Museveni the federation and the Swahili language was also meant to cover up for the Banyarwanda identity especially the pastoral communities that are randomly scattered all over the region. These pastoral communities of Tanzania's Kagera Region had assisted Museveni during the fight against Amin. Now they are securing the southern border.

INFORMATION IS POWER!

http://changeofguards.blogspot.ca/2017/01/eac-military-alliance-musevenis-major.html

Brig. Karemire comes with 'information draught' - #Uganda



In the recent army reshuffles, Museveni appointed his long time military spy, Brig. Richard Karemire as the Army Spokesperson.  With a Mwiru father and a Rwandese Tutsi mother, Karemire hails from Mbarara.
He joined the NRA around 1985 and went on to server under Military Intelligence (DMI) headquarters.  He served together with the current top brass of Rwanda's ruling RPF in the late 1980s when they were dominating CMI.  After they had captured power in 1994, Karemire took care of Kagame's children when they were still schooling in Uganda.


For many years he served under the Registry department and would also double as a self appointed liaison officer with other intelligence agencies.  It was until the reign of Gen. Tumukunde at CMI that Karemire was displaced owing to the former's policy of eliminating all those who had worked with Rwandese. 
Since Karemire had never had any for military training or exposure, he couldn’t venture into command positions. Instead he took up military diplomatic assignments in the region and had a stint at the army's protocol department.  With a clean service record, is a gentleman, intelligent, honest, clever, approachable, and confident by character but an experienced spy.  He has wide connections with the corporate world, business community and commands the respect, trust and confidence within the security circles.


Owing to lack of military training and field exposure, he may not articulate tactical military propaganda but he will prove good for handling strategic and doctrine information. The days of uncoordinated statements arising out of excitement are over.  The public will now be availed with processed information and only when necessary.
Brig. Karemire underwent intelligence training with the North Koreans at Kireka in the late 1980.  He will prefer to deal with the CEOs of the media houses instead of the reporters in the fields.  Easy-going Journalists will be recruited into spy agencies and many hot stories will be 'killed'.  With Ofwono Opondo proving 'hostile' at the Media Centre, his being sand-witched between Col. Bantariza and Brig. Karemire should give him a clear signal of tough times ahead.
INFORMATION IS POWER AND DEFIANCE IS THE WAY TO GO

Thursday, 19 January 2017

CMI slides back to the dogs - #Uganda

Museveni's Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence (CMI) is supposed to be a department of the army charged with collecting and processing of intelligence of a purely military nature.  However, over the years Museveni has incorporated this unit into a coercive arm of his regime structures.  It is mainly preoccupied with collecting internal political intelligence and activities to undermine political opposition.

It targets members of the opposition, civil society, religious leaders, Ugandans in exile, facilitates land grabbing, settles business disputes and collects debts, aids and abets economic crimes, intimidates judicial officers and reverses court decisions, it kidnaps, arrests, torture and detain without trial in its illegal detention centers dubbed Safe Houses.  With the privatisation of the police in recent years, CMI operatives have been operating in the armpits of the brutal police thus why it's been less in the limelight.

However, its individual operatives have continued to commit heinous crimes while enjoying the protection of their highly placed 'god-fathers'.  All the above engagements account for the increased incidents of treasonable acts and the so called coup attempts within the military of recent.  It's only that there are no serious coup plotters, otherwise CMI has no time to detect a well crafted plot.



Credit be given to the outgoing CMI boss, Brig. Charles Bakahumura who to some extent brought some sanity on the institution whose reputation had gone to the dogs.  The department started from the Bush War and was called DMI.  It was headed by Maj. (Rtd) Kaka Bagenda before he was replaced by Mugisha Muntu.

After capturing power, it was headquartered at Basiima House in Mengo.  Muntu was replaced by Andrew Lutaaya who was also replaced by Byemaro Mijumbi.  Byemaro Mijumbi was replaced by Fred Tolit who was also replaced by Henry Tumukunde.  Up to this time, discipline and integrity of the institution was a priority.  The love for money and material wealth was a taboo.  Its personnel were predominantly tested cadres.

With the advent of terrorism, it was during Tumukunde's reign that the institution changed colour.  Tumukunde sought to get rid of the old guards who had worked with the Rwandese.  He brought in staff members who were mostly opportunistic 'workers' as opposed to cadreship. Museveni took most of the senior managers like Charles Angina and others into command positions. The institution became openly politicised and safe houses were introduced.

Tumukunde was replaced by Brig. Mayombo who had no single experience in intelligence craft. The operatives instead managed his weakness and excitement to their advantage.  The institution went to the dogs but for Museveni, it served his political interests of terrorising Ugandans.

Mayombo was replaced by Mugira who had earlier served under DMI as a junior officer.  The situation worsened and he was replaced by Brig. Kyanda under whose reign the situation became worse.  It had become clear that CMI had taken charge of the country's internal security.  However, its central role was shared by police's mushrooming intelligence outfits thus why the reign of Brigadier Bakahumura became somehow sober in the public eye.  Bakahumura is now relieved because he was close to Gen Tumukunde who had recruited him into CMI and replaced by the 'little known' Col. Abel Kandiho.

RO/01976 Col. Abel Kandiho is not little known.  He served under the Presidential Guard unit before moving to CMI where he rose to head the notorious JATT around 2008.  He was later posted to Military Police as the Acting Commandant.  It was around this time that he was awarded the Independence Medal.  It was later revealed during the trial of armed dissidents in Kigali that Col. Abel Kanduho had used those sensitive positions to provide protection to them during their errands in Uganda.  This diplomatic scandal was swept under the carpet and here he is at the helm of the sensitive CMI. 
Intelligence is about networking at national, regional and international levels.  It remains to be seen what his working relationship with his counterparts in Rwanda will be like.   He is well known for using his authority to encroach and grab land and he has a pending civil suit before the High Court in Mbarara vide HCT 05-CV-MA 0045-2012 JAMES MISHENI Vs Lt. Col. Abel Kandiho.

Since the reign of Byemaro Mijumbi when Museveni created the position of Deputy CMI to accommodate Fred Tolit, the institution has had the following officers holding that position:  Tolit, Aronda, F. Mugisha, Musanyufu, Butuuro, D. Twesigomwe, H. Mbonye, and R. Karemire.  Why not appoint any of these instead of a rogue Col. Kandiho?  Instead of parliament vetting Gen. Katumba for the Ministry of Works position, it should instead vet Col. Kandiho because the position is more to do with human rights and the country image.  For Museveni, Col. Kandiho is his best.


INFORMATION IS POWER!
CMI slides back to the dogs - #Uganda

Wednesday, 18 January 2017

Focus on #Uganda's 12 army commanders



Uganda's post independence history is characterised by violence where the military has taken a center stage.  Like past leaders, Museveni's 30 years hold on power has been enabled by his manipulation of the military.  He has excelled in playing the ethnic card far better than his predecessors in as far as recruitment, training, deployment, promotion and retirement is concerned.

1.  1964 Brig. Shaban Opolot became independent Uganda's first Army Commander.  The Ibingira faction of the UPC in league with Buganda kingdom hatched a plan to use Brig. Opolot to overthrow the Obote government.  Obote moved faster and had Brig. Opolot placed under house arrest before replacing him with his deputy, Col. Iddi Amin. In 1966 Brig. Opolot was dismissed from the army before being detained without trial.



2.  In 1971 Gen. Iddi Amin overthrew Obote's UPC government and established a military government.  He released Brig. Opolot and assigned him to Ghana as Ambassador.  He had no Army Commander.



3.   After the overthrow of Iddi Amin in 1979, the new army (UNLA) designated Gen. Tito Okello as the Army Commander.  UNLA's cohesion was undermined by Museveni's insurgent NRA.  The Acholi officers moved again the Langis and in July 1985, Gen. Tito Okello overthrew the 2nd UPC government and became the President.


4.  Museveni's NRA tricked the UNLA into peace talks and five months later, in January 1986 he overthrew the Tito Okello government.  His NRA had Gen. Elly Tumwine as the Army Commander and a Rwandese refugee, Fred Rwigyema as his deputy.


5. The NRA which had been founded on ethnic and partisan lines has for the last 30 years struggled to maintain that posture.  Gen. Tumwine who was labelled insensitive to fighters was replaced by Museveni's young brother, Gen. Saleh in late 1980s.



6.  Gen. Saleh was hastly dropped from that position in 1989 after it emerged that he was plotting a coup against Museveni.  He had ganged up with some senior commanders who were being displaced by the educated lot.


7.  The only son of a prominent UPC leader who joined the Bush War, Gen. Mugisha Muntu was the DMI upon coming to power. He was made to skip the rank of Brigadier to Major General and replaced Gen. Saleh as Army Commander in 1989.  As has always been the case, Museveni had some schemes for which he wanted to use and misuse Gen. Muntu.  Being a strict disciplinarian, Gen. Muntu had trouble with disgruntled army officers.  It was during his tenure that Museveni introduced the practice of 'Katebe' (rendering officers redundant).  Museveni believed that it was Gen. Tinyefuza who was rallying these officers.

Gen. Muntu's spirit was irreparably broken when a group of junior officers led by now Col. Rwashande publicly attacked him calling him a Mwiru who was all out to eliminate Hima officers.  Most disturbing is the fact that being 'home boys', Museveni did not sanction any disciplinary action.  After nine years, Muntu was dropped in 1998 and replaced by Gen. Jeje Odong.  Shortly after he sought to retire from the army and Museveni offered him the Ministry of Defence which he rejected.  Knowing his resolute character, he let him go with a sh.50m cash send off to invest in his stone quarry business.


8.  Gen. Jeje Odong tenure was a very difficult one since he was not a Bush War hero.  He had been the I.O of Kabamba when the NRA attacked it in 1981 and consequently the government detained him till 1985 when it was overthrown.  In 1986 he joined the NRA as a Lt. Without retiring from the army he contested and lost a parliamentary seat for Amuria county.  He was made Army Commander in 1998.  In 2001 he was replaced by Gen. Kaziini whom he had just accused of gross misconduct in the Congo military adventure.  The then army Spokesperson, Brig. Keitirima accused him of leaking army secrets.


9.  For Gen. Kaziini to rise to that position, Gen. Katumba Wamala had to first be diverted to Police.  Kaziini's major task was to prepare war against Rwanda but was called off midway.  With Museveni's
blessing Kaziini embarked on purging the unwanted and propelling the home boys and regime cadres into command positions.  It's because of the ICC trial of Congo warlords, that Kaziini was dropped and eventually killed.


10.  Gen. Aronda who was Museveni's blue-eyed boy right from the bush days.  His appointment was meant to diffuse the threat from Rwanda and to privatise the army.  Indeed, he successfully accomplished the two tasks and was in 2013 assigned to help Gen. Kayihura to privatise the police on top of immigration services, National ID and other related sectors.


11.  Gen. Katumba Wamala who joined the NRA after take over, was appointed to preside over a privatised army in order to appease the Baganda.  He must be very relieved following his sacking last week owing to the humiliations he has been suffering at the hands of Museveni's son and his elite SFC.  His was sacked was because of distancing himself from the Kasese killings of over 100 people and was reported to be getting closer to ordinary soldiers.


12.  Gen. Muhoozi David is standing in for Museveni's son, Gen. Muhoozi Keinerugaba who is In-charge of combat operations.  Unlike Gen. Katumba, being a 'home boy', he won't have problems with reporting to Museveni through the son.  

Muhoozi joined the army in late 1985. He did the Officer Cadet Course at Jinja in 1989 together with the likes of Kayanja Muhanga and Rwanda's Gen. Kabarebe.  Muhoozi is a humble and approachable son of Mzei Rubakuba of Kiruhura and is incorruptible.  He came to prominence during the Congo expedition where he commanded the 59th Battalion which is part of SFC and after he flew rebel leader Rogers Lumbala to Kampala where it is reported he brought a briefcase full of US dollars to Museveni who ordered that Muhoozi's 59th Bn moves from Bunia to Bafasende to cover Rogers Lumbala.  Consequently, the vacuum created in Bunia made it easy for a Hema/Lendu killing spree that left hundreds dead.  RCD-Kisangani leader, Prof. Wamba was only saved by then. Col. Angina who deployed the only tank from the airport to his residence. 

Museveni has excelled in manipulating the army for political survival.

INFORMATION IS POWER
http://changeofguards.blogspot.ca/2017/01/focus-on-ugandas-12-army-commanders.html

Monday, 16 January 2017

#Uganda 'Team #Muhoozi' enters 'semi-finals'; past armies', bush war Officers eliminated

In order to understand Museveni’s ongoing army shuffles you need to look at it from a historical perspective.  Historically, Museveni's army is comprised of the following categories of personnel:
1.  A few Ugandans and Rwandese refugees/immigrants whom Museveni recruited under FRONASA in the 1970s took them to Tanzania to fight the Iddi Amin regime.  Only Museveni, Gen. Saleh, Gen. Ivan Koreta are still in military uniform.
2.  Ugandans and Rwandese refugees who were recruited under FRONASA after the Tanzanian army hand crossed the border into Uganda in late 1978.  After the overthrow of Amin in 1979, the UNLF government reorganised the different Anti- Amin fighting groups into one army, UNLF.  Rwandese were rejected but Museveni retained them as his private army thus how the likes of Fred Rwigyema, Kagame and others ended up being Bush War pioneers.
3.  Former FRONASA soldiers who escaped from the UNLA and joined the Bush War with Museveni -  1981 - 84.  Gen. Tumwine, Gen. Saleh, Gen. Koreta, Gen. Pecos, Col. Fred Mwesigye, Brig. Chihandae, Col. Samson Mande, Brig. Fred Bamwesigye, Brig. Cheff Ali, Paul Kagame, Col. Kyakabale, Maj. Rubaramira and many others.
4.  Former UA soldiers who had served under Iddi Amin and joined the Bush War in the early 1980s.  Tadeo Kanyankole, Nasur Izaruk, Italikire Kiiza, Mzee Barihona, Col. J.m Kaganda, Brig. Kashilingi and others.
5.  Civilians who joined the NRA during the early days of the Bush War.  Gen. Biraro, Gen. Otafiire, Col. Bright Rwamirama, Gen. Nalweyiso, P. Keitirima, Brig. Henry Matsiko, Gen. Kalekyezi, Gen. Aronda, Gen. Muntu, Gen. Kyaligonza, Gen. Tinyefuza, Gen. Muhweezi, Col. Besigye, Col. Sserwanga Lwanga, Brig. Andres Lutaaya, Dr. Bata, Col. Mushega, Col. Tom Butime, Brig. Elly Kayanja, Maj. Kazoora, Col. Fred Bogere, Col. Kwiringira, Col. Kasura Kyomukama, Gen. H. Tumukunde and others.
6.  UNLA officers who surrendered to the NRA in Western Uganda around late 1985.  Gen. Julius Oketta.
7.  Civilians who joined the NRA Bush War in Western Uganda around late 1985.  Brig. Mayombo, Gen. James Mugira, Col. Bantariza, Gen. David Muhoozi, Brig. Kayanja Muhanga, Brig. Richard Karemire, Joseph Musanyufu, Brig. Rwakitarate, Col. Patrick Mwesigye, Col. D. Tweisigomwe, Col. Tweisigye and a good number of others who were diverted to ISO.  At the time of joining, the semi-illiterate bush war veterans referred to this category as Kyamukwese' to mean that they had not fought the bush war.  Indeed, this category did not fight and some of them have never released a bullet.  Many of them upon coming to power took up administrative positions and earned promotions on that basis.
8.  Those who joined the NRA from UFM around late 1985.  Brig. Kasirye Gwanga and group and have ever since been phased out.
9.  Those who joined the NRA from UFM and FEDEMU after it had captured power in 1986.  The top cream had also earlier served the UA under Iddi Amin.  Brig. Hussein, Ada, Col. Mark Kodil, Kalyesubula and many others especially who were systematically purged out.
10.  Those who joined the NRA from UNLA after takeover in 1986.  Gen. Katumba Wamala, Gen. Jj Odong, Gen. Rusoke, Gen. Oketcha, Brig. Kalyebara, Col. John Kasaija, Brig. Mugyenyi, Brig. Fred Tolit, Gen. Charles Angina, Col. Benard Obola, Gen. Lakara, Col. M. Loum, Col. Othieno, Brig. Dr. Ochen, Col. Elaborot, Col. Muzoora.
11.  Former UA soldiers under Iddi Amin who joined the NRA after take over in 1986.  Brig. Rwehururu, Col. Laurence Kitts, Brig. Willis Byarugaba, Gen. Owoyesigire, Joshua Masaba, and others.
12.  Banyarwanda civilians and former soldiers (UA, UFM, and UNLA) who joined the NRA during the Bush War and after take over. 85% of the top cream of the current Rwanda army left the NRA in 1990 by invading Rwanda.
13.  Those who joined the NRA in late 1980s from the Acholi and Teso based rebel groups of UPDA, UPA, and HSM.  Brig. Charles Otema, Col. Dan opito.
14.  Civilians who joined the NRA after take over (1986 - 1990).  Gen. Mbadi, Col. Kulaigye, Sabiiti Mutengesa, Brig. Sabiiti Mutebile, Col. Mbonye, Col. Butuuro, Brig. Okiding.
15.  Those who joined the NRA in the early 1990s from West Nile based rebel groups of UNRF and WNBF.  Gen. Bamuze, Gen. Taban Amin.
16.  Those who joined the NRA indirectly from the LRA in the mid 1990s.  Col. Oula, Brig. Loketch, Col. Angello Okello.
17.   Those civilians who have been joining the NRA/UPDF since the mid 1990s under the Muhoozi project.
Therefore, the shakeup favors category No. 7 and after the next one or two reshuffles, it is the No. 17 category that will take over.  Gen. Katumba and Gen. Koreta who were supposed to replace Gen. Jeje Odong had to be diverted to police and ISO respectively to allow Gen. Kaziini and Gen. Aronda to take over.  Gen. Oketta was supposed to replace Katumba but died.

INFORMATION IS POWER. DEFIANCE IS THE WAY TO GO!

http://changeofguards.blogspot.ca/2017/01/uganda-team-muhoozi-enters-semi-finals.html

Friday, 13 January 2017

Thieves in #Uganda and abroad - #Museveni will rule forever



In desperation to get information shared globally, many Ugandans forget that accusing Museveni of being a thief does not exclude them from theft.

Ugandans wait for a courageous person and his team to take down the ruling junta and then run into the streets looting and stealing while burning down everything in sight which they cannot take home.

It is public knowledge that Museveni and his Fronasa, NRM and NRA stole chicken, cassava and moved onto stealing cows and robbing banks, etc..

The current state of stealing in Uganda is beyond commodities.  Some of the best steal ideas or plain lift writing by others and present the writing as their own.

In this age, anyone can trace if you plagiarized.  Plagiarism is theft.

No one asks you to pay for anything.  All you have to do is declare the source of the information you are sharing.  Most times in journalism, one protects the source so we end up saying "Author identity with held".  And you all know that you should always protect your sources. However, plagiarizing from a website which is already public shows us that you are incapable of acknowledging the original source and you have chosen to steal.

Lifting something from other people's work and sharing it as your own work will put a dot on your credibility.

If you are reading this, it is likely because you have been lifting writing from this website and sharing the writing as your own.  Love Google. Everything can be traced.  Please indicate always indicate the source of the information you share.

Most anyone who is an activist does not disclose their source but most do read a lot and can tell fake from real.

INFORMATION IS POWER. DEFIANCE IS THE WAY TO GO!

http://changeofguards.blogspot.ca/2017/01/thieves-in-uganda-and-abroad-museveni.html


#Uganda’s #Museveni's intelligence community and 'moles' in FDC



Intelligence Community is a term used to collectively refer to a federation of different formal anti-Intelligence agencies of a particular sovereign state.  In Museveni's Uganda there has been both formal and informal intelligence outfits. Upon taking power in 1986 he has his three bush war intelligence outfits i.e. Civil Intelligence, Military Intelligence (DMI) and Clandestine.  Civil Intelligence came to be known as President's Office, DMI went to Basiima House and clandestine went 'underground'. 

Around the late 1980s, by statute President's Office became Internal Security Organisation (ISO) at the same time created the External Security Organisation (ISO).  During the late 1990s Henry Tumukunde re-named DMI as CMI.  For obvious reasons, unlike ESO which is manned by civilians mainly from Buganda and 'northern regions', ISO and DMI have predominantly been manned by soldiers from the western region.  During the late 80s and throughout the 90s, Buganda, northern, West Nile, and Eastern regions dominated the number of dissidents in the diaspora hence fell under the ESO docket.

Right from the start, these intelligence agencies had the sole task of ensuring that Museveni and the NRA regime retained power.  However, during the first decade (1981 - 1995), to some extent, these intelligence agencies had preserved sanity in the execution of their duties.  Their conduct came to be directed by the prevalent political terrain.  As Museveni's intentions to retain power by hook and crook became an open secret, these intelligence agencies were at hand to be used and abused.  Rogue officers took up strategic positions in these agencies and with the advent of global terrorism, the stage was set for Ugandans to feel the wrath.

As the military increasingly became visible as Museveni's power base, CMI became the lead agency. More informal intelligence outfits sprung up and in the absence of effective regulatory mechanism, they went on rampage terrorising, arbitrarily arresting, torturing, extorting, robbing, killing and detaining without trial.  The notorious Joint Anti-Terrorism Task Force (JATTF) was set up and torture chambers commonly known as Safe Houses were introduced.

Museveni boosted their actions by designating the Military Court Martial as a tool of covering up and evading justice to the civilian victims.  Despite widespread public outcry and repeated condemnation by local and international human rights organisations, the regime's political leadership has been at the forefront of affording them protection.  

In the meantime, the West and in particular the USA has treated them as partners in fighting terrorism, played a vital role in providing support in terms of training and logistical support to the intelligence agencies.

After satisfying himself that Ugandan dissidents in the diaspora had lost ground, he turned his back on ESO.  ISO has been suffering the same fate owing to the suspicion that former senior regime cadres who fell out with him had infiltrated it. As Museveni embarked on privatising the police, his first casualty was its traditional professional intelligence gathering body, the Special Branch (SB).  He disbanded it because it had been started by previous regimes and was
predominantly manned by officers from the northern and north-eastern regions.  As the police became more militarised, it has also succeeded in coming up with new intelligence outfits within its rank and file.

It has expanded its presence and influence to the core of the Ugandan society.  Using the cover of gathering crime intelligence, its primary duty is to gather political intelligence.  The rising and facilitation of millions of Crime Preventers is for the same objective.  Museveni has gone ahead to starve ISO in terms of logistical and financial facilitation in favour of Police.  This is what prompted the Director General of ISO (DG/ISO), Brig. Ronnie Balya to publicly present a paper that warned that rampant corruption could make the regime to fall. Shortly after he appeared before the parliamentary committee and openly expressed his frustration over poor facilitation of ISO.

Museveni's powerful police chief, Gen. Kalekyezi has taken the scheme to greater heights by expanding the intelligence network to all government departments and agencies.  However, he is using the same privilege to fight internal wars by undermining others through public exposure of their misdeeds. The most recent revelation over a fake multi-billion arms procurement deal allegedly by senior army officers and now the 6bn oil cash bonanza are the few such examples.

Because the FDC has assertively expressed intentions to remove the regime from power using the masses, it is obvious that the regime's intelligence gives priority to spy on it.  Using technical and human sources it gets updates directly from the FDC boardroom; but the FDC has made it clear it has no secret plans!

INFORMATION IS POWER. DEFIANCE IS THE WAY TO GO!

http://changeofguards.blogspot.ca/2017/01/ugandas-musevenis-intelligence.html

Wednesday, 11 January 2017

#Museveni's son takes charge of the #Uganda army



For the last one decade, Uganda's military dictator, Museveni has been propping his son to take over command of his army.  This is part of a wider scheme to have his son as the heir to the presidency of Uganda.

His irregular recruitment into the army, his preferential exposure to specialised training and deployment, and command of the elite Presidential Guard unit, the SFC was all aimed at achieving the same.  The issue has been and continues to be a hot topic of discussion in
Uganda and the whole world.

With most of the vital strategic units of the army under the control of the elite SFC, there is no doubt that Gen. Muhoozi was the army chief.  His strategic role and overall powers came to light recently when the commandos under his command killed more than 100 people in cold blood in Kasese.  The then figurehead army chief, Gen. Katumba Wamala distanced himself from the issuing of orders for the murderous Kasese operation.  It became clear that the orders had been issued by Museveni through his son onward to the ground commanders.

The opposition leader, Dr. Besigye made a statement exonerating Gen. Katumba Wamala - ".... we know who killed people in Kasese.  Its not Katumba Wamala".  This development together with Gen. Katumba’s recent tendency of being seen getting closer to the ordinary soldier infuriated Museveni.  He has had to sack Gen. Katumba and Katumba’s deputy Gen. Angina.

He elevated his son to the newly created position of Special Presidential Advisor in-charge of Operations.  This position puts his son at the helm of army operations.  During the 1980s there was the powerful office of the Chief of Combat Operation (CC0) under Museveni's brother, Gen. Saleh.  Then headquartered at the current offices of the Joint Clinical Research Center (JCRC) opposite the main gate of Lubiri barracks, this office was in charge of all operations in the army's field operations while the Army Commander was only concerned with administrative duties.  From CCO, Gen. Saleh took over as the Army Commander.   There is no doubt, Gen. Muhoozi is the new version of the old CCO.

In business terms, operations is the agency of an organisation charged with carrying on the principal planning and operational functions of a headquarters and its subordinate units.  In the military context, operation refers to military action, mission or manoeuvre including its planning and execution.  A military operation is the coordinated military actions a state or non-state actor, in response to a developing situation.



These actions are designed as a military plan to resolve the situation in the state's favor.  Operations may be of combat or non combat nature.  Military operational plans also called war plans are produced in accordance with the military doctrine of a particular army.  Military operations coordinate highest level senior army officers who shape strategy and revise it over time and the line officers who make tactical decisions on the ground in support of the laid out strategy.

Therefore, Gen. Muhoozi has been given the extra responsibility of presiding over all security/military and civil operations and reporting directly to his father who is the Commander-in-Chief.  All these top commanders will comfortably report to him who will in turn report to Museveni.  With the total elimination of bush war and past regime top commanders from the top-most positions of the army, his son now enjoys total loyalty.  Gen. Kayihura is on his way out of the police as Gen. Katumba Wamala takes up the role of Aide de Camp (ADC) to UNRA's Allen Kagina.  Given, the humiliation they have endured in their command positions, both Gen. Katumba and his Deputy, Gen. Angina must be feeling a lot of relief. 

Museveni can’t risk distancing his son from the army more especially at this time when the future is uncertain.  In March 2015 he made a public statement thus: "....... when God gave me a son Long before I thought of being President, I called him Muhoozi.  He will avenge me."  With the current position, Museveni will closely mentor his son on the Presidency and afford him sufficient diplomatic exposure through various assignments outside the country.

INFORMATION IS POWER AND DEFIANCE IS THE WAY TO GO
http://changeofguards.blogspot.ca/2017/01/musevenis-son-takes-charge-of-uganda.html