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Friday, 30 December 2016

GEN. KATUMBA DUPES PUBLIC ON TORTURE OF SOLDIERS - #UGANDA


Museveni's figurehead Army chief, Gen. Katumba Wamala has once again duped Ugandans by claiming to have ordered an investigation into the gruesome torture of Cpl. Ssebyala by his superiors.  Though over the years the army's excesses against civilians has been highlighted, gross human rights abuses against its own personnel has silently thrived.

The men and women in uniform live under fear, intimidation, injustice, mental and psychological torture all in the name of discipline.  The army court martial is Museveni's tool of terrorising security personnel and that’s why he has always advocated for civilians to be tried by military court martials.  These courts are nothing but a Museveni took of suppressing and subduing soldiers into submission. It for the same reasons that he fears to retire the likes of Gen. Ssejusa whom he feels can only be tamed by the monster court martial.


In June 2015 while serving in Somalia under AMISOM, Cpl. Ssebyala was accused of having sold Anti-Aircraft ammunitions to the Somali insurgents at US$ 1000.  He was gruesomely tortured before being incarcerated at the notorious Makindye Barracks in Kampala.  Medical records confirm loss of manhood as a result of physical torture.  In August 2016, he sought the intervention of the High Court and in response the army court martial as usual charged him with fresh charges of 'offences related to security'.

It was only until The Daily Monitor ran the story of Cpl. Ssebyala's torture that Gen. Katumba came out to issue empty promises of investigating the matter.  As a practice, the army does not like such injustices to get to the public thus it always gets tough on individual soldiers who do so.
Selling of war materials by soldiers under AMISOM to Somalia insurgents has been a practice.  In April 2013 Maj. Frank Kiwero and Capt. Hassan Watumba were arrested over knowingly training Somalia insurgents at the AMISOM training facility at Aljazera in Mogadishu. The two were detained without trial at Makindye barracks in Kampala.
In July 2014 top regime cadres from Kibuku district petitioned Museveni to release the two army officers in return for their support for his (Museveni) sole candidature.  In December 2014 Museveni directed the GCM to set free the two and they were indeed released.
Though by law serving soldiers are exempted from taking active roles in partisan politics, Maj. Kiweru had been an active regime mobilizer in Kibuku and Palisa region in general.  Since his release, the Major has been an active police mobiliser in that region.  However, in Somalia more soldiers were accused of selling war materials to insurgent before the Uganda contingent suffered a major attack from the insurgents that left a big number of 'Acholis' killed.
Just last week, Lt. Mware of Military Police petitioned the Uganda Human Rights Commission over physical torture by his juniors on the orders of his Superiors.  The incident took place in February 2015 at the Luzira Prison detachment where he had been deployed before being incarcerated at Makindye barracks.  He is now walking with the help of clutches. He is suing the Attorney General and the Commanding Officer of the Military Police, Col. Kanyesigye.
Around the same time, Capt. Trevor Kibuuka of CMI's Special Investigations Bureau (SIB) went to the High Court seeking an order for his release from the notorious Nalufenya dungeons.  On 28th November
2015 he was arrested from Central Police Station (CPS) in Kampala when he had gone to follow up on investigations involving illegal sale of arms.  He has since then been incarcerated at Nalufenya.  The matter of sale of arms and hiring them out to robbers is a sensitive issue because it is a privilege of a few highly connected individuals in the security forces and it accounts for the insecurity in the country.
It is a common practice for individual intelligence officers to carry out investigations into armed robberies for personal gain and in that process they clash with their colleagues.  Capt. Kibuuka must have been of such mission and now that he has gone to the High Court and the press, his military career ruined and is set for a long ordeal of misery.
In 2014 Capt. J. B. Lutwama who was facing charges of treason in the infamous 'Kabamba Attack’ was tortured to death by crushing his testicles at Makindye Barracks.  In the mid 1990s, Col. Samson Mande who is now exiled in Sweden was physically and mentally tortured at Makindye barracks. 
Leave alone the physical torture meted out on Gen. Moses Ali and Col. Ahmed Kashillingi in the late 1980s and 1990s respectively while in detention at Lubiri barracks by Gen. James Kaziini.  What about Pte Muhindo who was gruesomely tortured by Museveni's son Gen. Muhoozi just because while driving his (Muhoozi) wife in the potholes, she had bumped he head on the car bonnet and developed headache.  The list is endless.
INFORMATION IS POWER 

http://changeofguards.blogspot.ca/2016/12/gen-katumba-dupes-public-on-torture-of.html

Wednesday, 28 December 2016

Second #Rwanda #Genocide in #DRCongo - Part 3


The predominant Bangilima tribe of both Goma and Bukavu issued an ultimatum for all the Tutsis to leave Congo.  In order to give the Banyamulenge rebellion a Congolese image, the RPF hastly brought on board Laurent Kabila (Sr) in October 1996.  His ADFL rebel group was incorporated into the armpits of RPF soldiers and the insurgent Banyamulenge.

Kabila had in the 1960s attempted to fight the Kinshasha government with the backing of the communist world that saw the likes of Che Guevara camping in the South Kivu region.  Museveni joined the rebellion by attaching his artillery regiment to boost the RPF and rebels’ firepower.  In the same month the RPF backed ADFL overran the South Kivu provincial capital of Bukavu killing thousands of Hutu refugees.  Those who survived fled northwards to Goma. 
In November 1996 the RPF overran Goma town before bombarding and later attacking Mugunga refugee camp.  Tens of thousands of Hutu refugees were killed like flies.  Tens of thousands of those who survived fled into the interior of the equatorial rain forest where they were followed and slaughtered.  This attack also hit the camps at Katale, Nyabikere and Kibumba.
Some few managed to flee in a journey that saw them through the thick rain forest and across the River Congo to as far as Congo Brazzaville and beyond ahead of the rebel advance. 700,000 Hutu refugees were forcefully repatriated back to Rwanda.  A local Nyamulenge leader of the Democratic Alliance for the people, Miller Ruhimbisa rallied other Banyamulenge groups in Shaba and Kasai regions to rebel against the Mobutu government. 
In the capital Kinshasha mobs protested the Tutsi rebellion in the eastern region by plundering homes and businesses of Banyamulenge and Rwandese nationals.
In March 1997 Kisangali fell to the rebels.  In April Kasai, Mbuji Mai and Lubumbashi fell to the rebels. Laurent Kabila went to the UN and demanded that within 60 days all Hutu refugees should have been repatriated back to Rwanda.  The UN agencies managed to airlift a few of them back to Rwanda.  In May 1997 Mobutu fled Kinshasha to his northern home town of Gbadolite.

In July 1997 the UN report revealed that the RPF backed ADFL rebels has so massively and systematically killed Hutu refugees that it amounted to crimes against humanity thus Genocide.  The rebels advanced on Kinshasha and the Mobutu government fell.  He fled into exile in Aligeria where he died in September 1997.
The Mobutu government easily crumbled simply because it was a military autocracy and corrupt.  His army was run of the foundation of nepotism and patronage.  The Civil Guards Commander, Gen. Kpama Barimoto; years later lost his gold to Gen. Saleh in Kampala) was his brother in law; the Commander of the Special Presidential Guard Division, Gen. Etien Nzimbi was his nephew and the Chief of Staff, Gen. Eluki Monga was from his Ngabandi tribe; not to mention his son, Gen. Mobutu Kongolo.
Family ties, wealth and ethnic association blinded most of his commanders.  Mobutu had been a strong ally of Rwanda's Habyarimana; he helped halt the RPF advance in the early 1990s, trained his presidential guard and buried his remains in the northern Congo town of Gbadolite.  With the end of the cold war, the donor community had frozen developmental aid in return for democratisation thus the appointment of Kengo Wa Wadondo as Prime Minister.

With the advent of the Tutsi RPF in Kigali, the Museveni government in Uganda and the Tutsi government in Burundi at the time, it was just a matter of time before the Congolese Tutsis sought for their share in the regional cake thus the rise of the Banyamulenge to prominence that has set Congo into flames with devastating effects on the entire region.
Laurent Kabila formed a government dominated to Tutsis.  RPF army officers took direct charge of key military positions.  The hunt for and systematic elimination of Rwandese Hutus continued unabated.  It was not long before Congolese resented the dominance by Tutsis.

In August 1997 enraged Congolese in eastern region founded a Democratic Resistance Alliance to fight Tutsi dominance before demanding that they should leave Congo.  This resistance spearheaded by the predominantly Bemba tribe was joined by the Bashi, Bafulero, Bavira, Bahutu, Bahunde and Banyanga tribes of South Kivu province. 
It is this resistance that gave rise to local militias popularly known as Mai Mai.  Laurent Kabila couldn’t withstand the pressure of another rebellion and he ordered the RPF to leave Congo.  In September 1997, the RPF withdrew taking with it tens of thousands of Banymlenge to Rwanda. In Sept 98 RPF which could not afford to get off the back of Congo organised a fresh rebellion of mostly Banyamulenges in the eastern who broke off the Kabila's ADFL government.

The Hutu refugees who had enjoyed a break in their bloody persecution joined hands with the Congolese army to fight the RPF backed fresh RCD rebellion in eastern Congo that persists to this day.
Since the Kagame regime has chosen to refer to the 1994 genocide as Genocide Against Tutsi, then the killing of Hutus in Congo can as well be called the Genocide Against Hutus.
INFORMATION IS POWER

http://changeofguards.blogspot.ca/2016/12/the-2nd-rwanda-genocide-in-drccongo.html

Tuesday, 27 December 2016

Second #Rwanda #Genocide in #DRCongo - Part 2


A UN humanitarian base was established at Entebbe Airport in Uganda. Lt. Gen. Schroeder was tasked to initiate a Kigali Airport centred relief operation for the Rwandese hutu refugees in Zaire's Kivu
province.  The international media gave extensive coverage of the catastrophe against Hutu refugees in Congo.  This prompted the western donor community and relief organisations to rush to offer humanitarian relief to the needy in Kivu. Shortly after the UN humanitarian and relief agencies were back in control of the situation such that by late August 1995 the death toll had fallen below 25 per day.  By mid September, Kigali Airport had increased its cargo handling from 300 to 600 tonnes of aid per day.  The United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) and other NGOs took Charge of transhipment from Kigali to Goma.
Widespread environmental degradation and other misconducts fueled hostility between the local Congolese residents and the Hutu refugees. The locals wished to see refugees repatriated back to Rwanda. The government in Kinshasa set up a parliamentary commission of inquiry which recommended that refugees should be forcefully repatriated to Rwanda.  In April 1995 the national assembly in Kinshasa adopted the report and called for an unconditional repatriation of Rwandese Hutu refugees.  The former Rwandese government officials had ganged up with the defeated army and the Interahamwe Hutu militias to form a government in exile.  They had taken over behind the scenes management of the refugee camps by organising refugees according to their former local government formations.  In the camps Hutu soldiers donned military fatigue and carried heavy military weapons in broad daylight.
They had a ready supply of recruits and had set up training bases and allegedly with the help of foreign governments they were amassing arms ready to make a counter attack on the Tutsi RPF in Rwanda.  The Tutsi government in Burundi and its cousin Museveni regime in Uganda provided the barriers for Hundreds of thousands of potential Rwandese Hutu refugee recruits in Tanzania to cross to Zaire and join the military preparations.  In Nairobi, elite Hutu exiles founded the Rally for the of Democracy in Rwanda.  Some of its top leaders like Seith Sendashonga and Col. Lizinde were later to be assassinated in Nairobi.  The situation was the same even in the Hutu refugee camps located in South Kivu province.  The general mood among the refugees was that of a return match with the Tutsi RPF in Kigali. 
These Hutu refugee leaders used intimidation and propaganda to dissuade their colleagues from returning to Rwanda. Events inside Rwanda like the infamous Kibeho massacre of Hutu civilians by the Tutsi RPF soldiers justified the propaganda and boosted the resolve of the militants.
As the camps became more militarised, the new Tutsi RPF government in Kigali accused the aid agencies of feeding genociders while the aid agencies threatened to abandon the refugees owing to threats from militants.  The Mobutu government intervened in the security of the camps by deploying 1500 soldiers mostly Para commandos and some members of the elite Presidential Guard to take charge.  
For decades Congolese had identified all Congolese of Rwandan origin as Banyarwanda.  However, with the advent of Hutu refugees and the ensuring escalating tension, the cattle keeping Banyarwanda came to identify themselves as Tutsi Banyamulenge.  Many of them had fought alongside the Tutsi RPF to overthrow the Hutu government in Kigali.
They were traditionally concentrated in the Kivu region of eastern Congo.  Initially incorporated into the Belgium Congo area that had been part of the historic Kingdom of Rwanda but only to be divided by colonial boundaries.  They were predominantly concentrated in the Itumbwe plateau and as more Tutsi fled to Congo in the 1959 joined them, the area of influence extended to the mountainous Milenge thus the name 'Banyamulenge'.  It is these Banyamulenge that Museveni sought to ally with when he visited the area in the late 1960s during his journey to the presidency.  In February 1996 some sizeable number of Banyamulenge fled to Rwanda alleging that they were attacked by the Hutu Interahamwe, Zaire national army (FAZ) and were housed in Nkamira camp.  By April 1996, 260,000 Banyamulenge had fled to Rwanda with a few fleeing to Uganda.  In September 1996, the Governor of South Kivu province ordered Banyamulenge to leave Congo prompting a revolt by the Banyamulenge in North Kivu.
Banyamulenge soldiers in the Mobutu army started deserting and fleeing to their traditional strongholds of Mitumba mountains where they declared a rebellion against the Mobutu government.  
The Mobutu government accused the Tutsi RPF in Kigali of arming Banyamulenge. Around the same time, 50 Banyamulenges were massacred around Uvira town in South Kivu.
INFORMATION IS POWER, DEFIANCE IS THE WAY TO GO!

http://changeofguards.blogspot.ca/2016/12/drcongo-2nd-rwanda-genocide-continued.html

Friday, 23 December 2016

Second #Rwanda #Genocide in #DRCongo - Part 1

Eastern DRC region of North and South Kivu provinces have a number of indigenous communities whose dialect and cultural heritage is closely related to Banyarwanda.

During the colonial partition the artificial boundaries did not consider that cultural closeness. In a 1910 meeting held in Brussels, German, Britain and Belgium drew a line from Sabinyo Mountain at the Uganda/Rwanda/Congo border northwards to Lake Albert and then eastwards to Lake Victoria.

That way even Uganda's present day Bufumbira in Kisoro which neighbors with Rwanda's Hutu stronghold of Ruhengeri until 1928 had continued to be referred to as British Rwanda.

Rwandese pastrolists and cultivators had since time immemorial been migrating to Kivu. Congo's Belgium colonial administration ferried many Rwandese into Kivu region in order to enhance production and mining and more especially during WW II because of the need for financing the war efforts.

The 1959 Hutu revolution in Rwanda brought into Congo a new breed of Rwandese Tutsi. This new group were refugees who were simply seeking temporary sanctuary and safety as they made efforts to reclaim their country.

In 1960 a political disagreement broke out between Congo's Prime Minister Lumumba and his President Kasavubu that saw the former being assassinated in 1961.

A rival government was set up in the eastern Congo with backing from the Communist block and its several allied African governments.

The crisis escalated by bringing in the likes of the infamous revolutionary Che-Guevara to assist the armed rebels that were led by the likes of Kabila (Sr), Peter Mulele, Gaston Soumaliot and others.

They set up a government in exile based in Burundi with forward rebel bases in Kivu inside Congo. It is this deepening crisis and the cold war factor coupled by the rivalry between President Kasavubu and the pro-Shaba secessionist Moise Tsombe that was exploited by Mobutu to take over government in Congo in 1965.

The Rwandese in Kivu did not own land but simply occupied land that was traditionally owned by local Hunde Chiefs who rented it out to them on agreed terms and conditions including payment of taxes.

There had always been tensions between the cattle keeping Rwandese and the indigenous cultivators in the area. However, the Congolese did not know the ethnic differences of Tutsi/Hutu among the Rwandese.

They were collectively identified as Banyarwanda and in 1965 tension between the Banyarwanda and other local ethnic communities turned into war that was dubbed "Kanyarwanda (sons of Rwanda)War" - emphasizing the common heritage of both Hutu and Tutsi.

Congo's President Mobutu who was mindful of the potential of different political forces to destabilize the region, initiated a regional economic block (CPGL) that brought closer cooperation between Rwanda, Congo and Burundi.

CPGL was mostly preoccupied with regional security and that is how harmonious co-existence between the three countries had been guaranteed.

To further contain Rwandese migrants, in 1972 Congo granted citizenship to all Banyarwanda. Despite that, in 1981 Congo's National Assembly withdrew citizenship from all migrant communities including Banyarwanda. Though this move never became law it became a general practice for Banyarwanda to have no voting rights but they continued to pay taxes to local Hunde Landlords.

In 1990 when the Rwandese Tutsi in exile under the RPF went around the CPGL obstacle and found a way of invading Rwanda from Uganda, several Banyarwanda Tutsi from Congo's Kivu region joined hands with the RPF.

The likes of Congolese Tutsi warlords like Gen Nkunda, Sultan Makenga and several others had fought alongside the RPF.

Congo's President Mobutu sent in reinforcements to the aid of his traditional ally Rwanda's President Habyarimana and helped FAR in training the elite Presidential Guard.

In 1991 the government of Congo set up a commission to identify 'non Congolese' in Kivu and Maniema provinces. In 1993 as the RPF ragged on inside Rwanda, the Banyarwanda Tutsi in Congo began agitating against perceived injustices more especially the payment of land taxes to local chiefs, voting and political representation rights.

They defied local leadership by forming a resistance organisation. Tensions exploded in several villages in northern Kivu between the local Hunde and Nande on one hand and the cattle keeping Banyarwanda on the other.

These tensions escalated into bloody ethnic fighting that witnessed hundreds being killed while thousands were displaced.

Between March and April 1993 an estimated 14,000 people were killed in ethnic fighting in Masisi and Walikale in North Kivu province. The provincial Governor was accused of inciting the ethnic clashes and was sacked by President Mobutu when he visited Goma in July 1993 before promising citizenship and voting rights to Banyarwanda.

In August 1993 the government of Congo accused the Banyarwanda of gun running into Rwanda. By October 1993 an estimated 3000 people had been killed while another 6000 displaced.

In April 1994 a Sacred Union of Radical Opposition Parties - a coalition of opposition parties announced it had founded an army to topple President Mobutu.

The ethnic conflict was escalated by the influx of the fleeing Hutu Rwandese into Kivu following the April-July 1994 Rwanda Genocide and the take over of power by the Tutsi led RPF.

After the fall of Kigali, the victorious RPF advanced into the traditional Hutu strongholds of Ruhengeri and Gisenyi in Rwanda thus sending tens of thousands of Hutu civilians, defeated soldiers, government officials and the militia Interahamwe into eastern Congo.

In mid July 1994 half a million refugees arrived in Goma, Congo followed by another half a million on 17th July 1994.

On 18th July 1994 an estimated 100,000 men, women and children crossed from the French controlled zone in Rwanda into Bukavu in Congo.

The UN refugee agency (UNHCR) which had planned for only half a million refugees was overwhelmed by the figure of approximately 1.2 million refugees. They spilled in every available space occupying schools,churches, government offices and anywhere they could find shelter.

They stressed government infrastructure including roads and health facilities. MSF could only provide 2% of the required 5litres of drinking water. ICRC airlifted from Nairobi and distributed rice, beans and cooking oil while WFP's food convoys took months to reach from Mombasa via Nairobi and Kampala.

Makeshift refugee camps were set up at Inera and Kishunshu in Bukavu while in Goma they were at Mugunga, Kibumba, Katale and Nyabireke.

By 20th July 1994 the situation had so much deteriorated that a cholera epidemic hit the refugees claiming 1200 lives per week.

The death toll rose to 2000 - 3000 per week and the peak was estimated to be 6000 per day. Dead bodies littered the roads from Goma town to the camps.

The USA President Bill Clinton called it the worst humanitarian crisis in a generation before he sent in US troops to help the French in supplying safe drinking water.

As you read this, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is undergoing political, tribal and ethnic tensions. It makes one wonder when The Great Lakes Region will ever know PEACE.

Information is power!

http://changeofguards.blogspot.ca/2016/12/behind-2nd-rwanda-genocide-in-drcongo.html?m=0

Thursday, 22 December 2016

#Uganda Military condoms - Obote's Shaban Opolot and #Museveni's Katumba Wamala



Brig. Shaban Opolot was Uganda's first Army Chief under the Obote I government while Gen. Katumba Wamala is the current chief of Museveni's army.  Brig. Opolot's military career ended in mid 1960s when he opposed Obote's move to use the army to violate the constitution.
Around mid 1964 Congolese secessionist rebels sought assistance from Obote's government for mercenaries from the Uganda Army.

The then army chief, Brig. Shaban Opolot opposed the sending of Uganda Army soldiers into Congo but Obote instead used the Deputy army chief, Col. Iddi Amin to execute the mission.  Bob Assles was the one flying Amin into the Congo during that mission.  In October 1965 Shaban Opolot was put under house arrest and replaced by Iddi Amin as army chief.

It is this illegal military expedition into the Congo that gave rise to the infamous Congo Gold Scandal probe by parliament against Obote, Iddi Amin and a few others. It is widely believed that Brig. Shaban Opolot who using his closeness to the Mengo establishment, leaked the KY Secretary General and mover of the motion in parliament, Daudi Ocheng.  Opolot testified before the commission of inquiry into the Gold Scandal in March 1966. In October 1966,

Obote accused him of having connived with Mengo and the Ibingira faction of UPC to attempt a coup. He dismissed him from the army before detaining him in Luzira Prison only to be released by Iddi Amin when he took over in January 1971.

Decades later, in an interview with the army's Tarehe Sita in October 1993, Brig. Shaban Opolot disclosed: ".... I was asked to clarify whether I had sent any soldiers to Zaire.  I had not.  Obote and
company had asked me to sign some documents purporting that sent troops to another sovereign state without the consent of government.......that how they had come to imagine that I had collaborated with Ibingira to overthrow the government.........going to Congo for gold was privately arranged".  The rest is history.

Just last week, Museveni's figurehead army chief, Gen. Katumba Wamala was exonerated by the main opposition leader, Dr. Besigye over the Kasese killings.  He stated thus: "......... we know who massacred Kasese people, not Gen. Katumba Wamala."  such a statement from the man whom Museveni regards as an enemy put Gen. Katumba in an awkward situation.  The matter was aggravated further by Gen. Katumba personally distancing himself from the same killings when he appeared before the parliamentary probe committee shortly after.  He made it clear that he was not in Kasese at the time of the attack and that he could not "macro manage" the situation thus did not give orders to attack and kill.

During Museveni's Congo military adventure a decade ago, Gen. Katumba was one of the overall commanders who led the ground troops in Congo. He must have learnt some lessons thus the courage to take a heroic stand on the current Kasese killings inquiry. However, unlike the heavy toll that was borne by Brig. Opolot, we are not likely to see Gen. Katumba suffer the same fate because he is an insignificant figurehead army chief.  However, owing to the threat of dragging the perpetrators to the ICC, somehow Gen. Katumba will suffer gradual consequences.

 It is a fact that the orders were issued by Museveni and his son, Gen. Muhoozi who is the de facto army chief.

INFORMATION IS POWER AND DEFIANCE IS THE WAY TO GO

http://changeofguards.blogspot.ca/2016/12/uganda-military-condoms-obotes-shaban.html

Wednesday, 21 December 2016

IT'S ONLY UNDER #UGANDA'S #MUSEVENI THAT A COMMISSIONED ARMY OFFICER DOES ARMED ROBBERY


Museveni gained power after undermining the past armies i.e. Uganda Army (UA) and Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) whom he accused of being anti-people.  He accused them of all sorts of crimes but the truth is that no commissioned army officer had ever got out a gun to go and carry out armed robbery.

Under Museveni, it has become the norm for both junior (2lt - Capt.) and Senior officers (Maj. - Gen) to be involved in armed robberies involving billions of shilling and loss of life.  As we talk now Capt.
Hakim Mangeni is under arrest for murdering an Eritrean business man and stealing his 7.5b shillings.

In May 2015, CMI's Capt. Peter Mushabe, Lt. Katwesigye and Sgt Nayebare were arrested on Museveni's orders for their involvement in sophisticated armed robberies throughout the country.  Among their victims were a Chinese construction company that was robbed of 1bn shillings and another Asian businessman who was robbed of 528 million shillings.

Mushabe and company being home boys have as usual been shielded by the regime.  We are yet to see if Capt. Mangeni will be afforded the same treatment.  The truth is that 95% of the incidents of insecurity and crime involving fire arms are directly and indirectly linked to members of the security services.  

Accumulation of wealth by whatever means has been favoured by Museveni in return for personal loyalty from the beneficiary army officers. On top of the oldest practice of armed robbery, the list now comprises of extortion, blackmail, protection of drug traffickers, smuggling etc.  In the meantime, lets continue crediting Museveni for creating a disciplined army and properly managing security.


INFORMATION IS POWER AND DEFIANCE IS THE WAY FORWARD 

http://changeofguards.blogspot.ca/2016/12/its-only-under-ugandas-museveni-that.html

Tuesday, 20 December 2016

DEFIANCE - #UGANDANS ARE ONLY GOOD AT JUBILATING OVER 'LIBERATORS'.



During the last presidential elections, the main opposition FDC campaigned on the theme of 'winning by defiance and not compliance'. It planned to defy all forms of rigging and intimidation by tightly
guarding its votes after close of the poles.  Pursuant to this strategy, in early November 2015 at a rally in Rukungiri it launched its grassroots mobilisation strategy dubbed Power Ten (P10).  

Under the P10 arrangement the FDC mobilise groups of ten supporters per village throughout the country who would in turn mobilise other supporters not only to go and cast their vote but to protect their vote.  With coordinators at national, district, county and parish levels, P10 aimed at mobilising about seven million votes out of the fifteen million registered voters.  During the launch, Dr. Besigye stated thus: ".... with P10, we shall rise at once.  This time we know what they are doing. If they dare do what they have been doing, we shall tell them that this time our vote is not going anywhere.  We shall tell you what to do.  Join P10 and be vigilant."

When P10 swung into action the regime felt cornered and as usual it came out to brand it a militant group.  The regime alleged that P10 was a grassroots structure to instigate countrywide violence. The chief of the army came out to condemn it with threats.  Two weeks before the elections, the Electoral Commission and the Police summoned the FDC for a meeting in which the FDC was ordered to disband P10. 

At the close of the polls the regime unleashed it wrath on the P10 and mayhem broke out.  Several were arrested, chassed from the polling stations, intimidated into hiding as Dr. Besigye and other party leaders were placed under arrest.  Amidst that reign of terror, the regime declared itself the winner of the elections and in places like Mbarara, Ntungamo, Kampala and Kasese where P10 put up a spirited fight, the terror turned bloody.  Since then the clampdown on the opposition in general has intensified and is about to mark its first anniversary.

In an interview with the Independent Magazine in March 2016, Dr. Besigye ruled out the possibility of taking up arms arguing that it disempowers the citizens and only empowers the armed elements thus:
".......the democratisation of power means the empowerment and involvement of citizens in acquiring that power".  In another interview with NBS TV in July, Dr. Besigye emphasized that he was to continue to mobilize Ugandans using a strategy that comprises three components - awareness, organisation and action.  He added that the regime could collapse anytime depending on the actions of the pro-change activists.

P10 was suppressed and subdued into oblivion.  The regime embarked on spending heavily on repression and compromising members of the FDC. In FDC strongholds like Kasese, the repression turned bloody leaving hundreds brutally murdered by security forces.  As Dr. Besigye continues to defy alone and bear the regime's brutality, violent incidents and arbitrary actions by the regime that would have sparked off countrywide mass uprising have come to pass.  Consequently, after the regime realizing that masses will never come out massively, it has slowed down acts of openly financially compromising members of the opposition and repression.

However, the FDC has succeeded in creating awareness because Ugandans are more informed and assertive now than before. Unfortunately, even with organisation and action, our people may never afford an Arab Spring kind of uprising but are looking forward to 'Mana falling from heaven' in the form of the usual so called armed liberators to cause regime change.  They are also hopelessly waiting for USA's Donald Trump to do miracles. The regime is not taking chances thus pre-emptive strikes against potential strategic geographical locations for an armed insurrection like the Rwenzori region. 

However, addressing members of the FDC in Mbarara last month, Dr. Besigye reaffirmed his commitment to championing defiance as opposed to the armed option pointing out that the armed option was prone to being labelled terrorism by the regime.  On the ongoing countrywide mobilisation by the FDC, he said ".........organise, coordinate and form cells similar to NRA Resistance Councils to ease communication".

 The regime is already alleging sinister motives of defiance.  During the Walk to Work protests in April 2011, Museveni told the press that those opposition protests were like unfertilized eggs. ".... there is no other plan. If they had other plan, it is an idiotic plan.  It will never work.  I always read this rubbish in the intelligence reports that Besigye is planning this, Besigye is planning that.  He is planning nothing, bure, bure (nothing).  It is not possible, theirs is idiocy".

Since independence, regime changes have been done by a small group and jubilated by millions of Ugandans. Plse, give them a break.


INFORMATION IS POWER! 

http://changeofguards.blogspot.ca/2016/12/defiance-ugandans-are-only-good-at.html

Monday, 19 December 2016

#Uganda - ANOTHER REGIME CADRE SHIELDED OVER MURDER - MAJ. JUMA SEIKO


On 4th December, 2016 Maj. Juma Seiko's private body guard shot dead two Ugandans and injured one.  The deceased, Lamek Ogawang and Fred Ssembatya were in the company and invitation of Solomon Mugabi who resides at Maj. Seiko's residence when they tried to enter the same residence located at Plot. 1 Nakasero Road.  

The bodyguard, Alex Cherotic who is an army veteran only allowed Mugabi to enter but stopped the three.  Without any reasonable excuse he shot dead the two and fatally injured Ssenkubuge.  Cherotic was arrested by the police and has been arraigned in court over Murder.  He had been dismissed with disgrace from the army for indiscipline but Maj. Seiko hired him as his private body guard before arming him with his AK 47 acquired from the army.  

It is not in dispute that Maj.  Seiko failed to safely keep his firearm, allowed it to be used by an authorised person and obviously aided the murder of two people and attempted murder of another.  Section 19 (b) & (c) of the Penal Code Act catches up with Maj. Seiko for aiding the commission of the murder thus a potential co-accused.  The Armed Force's Act also lays down offences related to misuse of firearms.  However, because Maj. Seiko is a permanent aide to the powerful Museveni's brother, Gen. Saleh, he is a regime political mobiliser in Sebei, and more so one of the wealthiest regime functionaries, he has been left off the hook.

In February 2012 another top regime cadre, George Agaba Ninsiima then Director of Physical Planning at KCCA went out to effect an illegal demolition of structures in one of the Kampala city suburbs. Upon a slight argument with local residents, Agaba was captured rushing to his car and picking an AK 47 assault riffle and aiming at the crowds.

When the gun jammed, his police bodyguard, Makmot Komaketch grabbed it from him and fired at the crowds instantly killing one person, John Onyango and injuring five others.  Both Agaba and his bodyguard were arrested by the police but as the guard was charged with murder, Agaba was released on police bond.  

It was after a lot of public outcry that Agaba was also charged with murder eight days later.  A year later, they were both acquitted for lack of evidence.  However, since Katonda Talya Nguzi (God takes no bribe), last week Agaba died in a motor crush which Museveni's sister narrowly survived with fatal injuries.

Agaba's battered remains were evacuated from the scene aboard a tipper lorry carrying gravel.  Unfortunately, many Ugandans openly jubilated Agaba's demise amidst protests by his family.

 In April 2011 regime security operatives, Peter Bimanywa and Paulo Mugenyi shot dead a two years old, Julian Nalwanga in Masaka.  They were simply briefly arrested and released later and the matter was closed.

On 5th February 2006, Lt. Ramathan Magara drove his car (that was decorated with Museveni's campaign poster) into the crowds of Dr. Besigye's campaign rally before shooting his AK 47 and killing two people and fatally injuring another two.  The regime shielded him from criminal proceeding for three years before eventually surrendering him for a negotiated trial before a cadre Judge.  

In 2009 High Court Judge Wilson Kwesiga exonerated him of murder and instead convicted him on Manslaughter before handing him a 14 years’ sentence.  The regime is spending a lot of taxpayer's money on his welfare and that of his family.  No wonder, the regime has promoted Judge Kwesiga to the position of Head of the High Court's Criminal Division replacing the no-nonsense Judge Wilson Munsee.

In February 2011 Col. Innocent Oula drove into the crowds at a campaign rally of Dr. Besigye in Namanve killing three people and injuring 11 others.   The matter just ended at the scene of crime and
Col. Oula is currently representing the army in parliament.

In March 2010 Museveni bodyguards shot dead three people at Kasubi Tombs.  The then CMI (Military Intelligence) chief, Gen. Mugira told the commission of inquiry that SFC Capt. Napoleon Namanya is the one who killed the three and the matter ended there.  Namanya is now a Colonel.
During the 2009 regime inspired riots in Kayunga, security forces shot dead 27 people and no one was made to account.

The most recent case of Kanyamunyu and company shooting of Jimmy Akena is another live example.  Its just a matter of time before they are afforded all the protection and as usual left off the hook.

The list is endless but the question is who is the next victim.


INFORMATION IS POWER AND DEFIANCE IS THE WAY TO GO.

http://changeofguards.blogspot.ca/2016/12/uganda-another-regime-cadre-shielded.html



Tuesday, 13 December 2016

What made Idi Amin become brutal? - #Uganda




First published on July 21, 2013
The new regime of Iddi Amin had initially been embraced by Ugandans and the international community. Iddi Amin made a cabinet line up composed of the best brains Uganda has ever had. The likes of Prof. Rugumayo, Prof. Banage, Wanume Kibedi, Princes Elizabeth Bagaaya, Grace Ibingira, Godfrey Binaisa and several others of that calibre were Amin's top government officials.
The strategic Buganda region had embraced Iddi Amin more especially after he arranged for the return of the remains of their king the Kabaka and according it a descent burial. Of course its the same Iddi Amin then a Colonel who had commanded the assault on king's palace leading to the king's exile where he died. Of course, Col. Iddi Amin as an Army officer was implementing the Commander in Chief (President Obote)'s orders.
Similarly, recently Gen. Tinyefuza pleaded superior orders for having masterminded the raid on High Court. Cabinet promoted Iddi Amin to the rank of General and appointed him President. Godfrey Binaisa publicly stated that Iddi Amin had overthrown Obote because the former loved Uganda.

Uganda's Ambassador to UN, Grace Ibingira wrote an article attacking Tanzania's Nyerere for giving sanctuary to deposed President Obote. Foreign Affairs Minister, Prince Elizabeth Bagaya urged the exiled former President Obote to return home because "the country was developing at a supersonic speed".


No doubt the Iddi Amin government was set to lead the country to stability and prosperity. However, this was not good news to those in exile who were bent on dislodging the new Iddi Amin government. All efforts were made to destabilise and tarnish the image of the Iddi Amin government by groups in exile.
Museveni and Oyite Ojok opened up clandestine subversive guerrilla cells inside Uganda. Driven by ambition, Museveni managed to convince Tanzania's President Nyerere that inside Uganda existed a general feeling of dissent against Iddi Amin such that a slight external invasion would trigger an internal uprising that would dislodge the regime.
President Nyerere blessed and facilitated an open day invasion of Uganda on 17th September 1972. After overrunning the Uganda border, the invaders split into two columns - the Okello column headed for Masaka while the Museveni one made up of five trucks headed for Mbarara. Within a few hours, the Uganda Army had overwhelmingly defeated the invaders on the two fronts.

Many of the invaders were either killed, captured and the remaining fled back to Tanzania. Worthy noting is the fact that ordinary civilians helped a lot in capturing and lynching the disarrayed invaders. Civilians in these areas paid heavily eight years later 1978/79 when Museveni carried out reprisal attacks during the full scale invasion that ousted Iddi Amin.
The whole venture had been ill prepared and unnecessary but was driven by Museveni's over ambitiousness. This incident and other acts of sabotage that followed made Iddi Amin to behave like a wounded buffalo.
INFORMATION IS POWER.

http://changeofguards.blogspot.ca/2016/12/what-made-idi-amin-become-brutal-uganda.html

Monday, 12 December 2016

Why Uganda can do better without the military – Part 4




7. Tens of thousands of people who have served under Uganda's military have not directly of indirectly contributed anything towards the economic development of the country.  Instead the military has been and continues to be the biggest consumer and an unnecessary burden on the national coffers.

8.  Because of its central role in the political, social and economic arena, the military has been and is the mirror of national disunity, regionalism, tribalism, ethnicity, nepotism and discrimination in general.


9.  With genuine democratic governance, equitable distribution of national resources, non negative interference in the internal affairs of neighboring countries through military support to their dissidents, Uganda would only need a professional national police to keep law and order.


Therefore, a democratic Uganda can as well take a break from military service and prosper without an army.  May be just one battalion for ceremonial parade and emergency relief operations in the event of a
calamity.  African countries don’t have a culture of invading their neighbors but are good at masquerading as liberator by aiding different dissident fighting groups.  Interestingly, the worst autocratic regimes have been at the forefront of destabilising other countries in the name of liberation.  Gadhafi was the chief liberator and now his heir Museveni is taking up his role in the Great Lakes Region, east Africa and Horn of Africa.

INFORMATION IS POWER AND DEFIANCE IS THE WAY TO GO


Why Uganda can do better without the military – Part 3




During the same year, an Acholi, Brig. Okoya who was being groomed to replace Iddi Amin was mysteriously murdered and Obote survived an assassination attemp.  In January 1971, the UA under the command of Iddi Amin overthrew Obote and seized power.  Obote took refuge in the neighboring Tanzania which refused to recognize the Iddi Amin government.  Among other refugees were UPC party functionaries like Museveni, Rwakasisi and a number of Acholi and Langi army officers.
After closing down the rebel camps in southern Sudan, the Acholi/Langi fighters relocated to Tanzania via the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. A year later, in 1972, pro-Obote fighting groups from Tanzania travelling in a convoy of 27 trucks invaded Uganda by overrunning the Mutukula border post.  Their aim had been to attack Masaka and Mbarara army barracks in anticipation of sparking off an internal rebellion against Amin.  Another group that was supposed to make a simultaneous commando raid on the Airforce base at Entebbe could not leave Kilimanjaro Airport owing to a tyre burst during takeoff abroad an East African Airways plane.  Meanwhile, in both Masaka and Mbarara the UA thoroughly beat off the invading Ugandans leaving several dead and hundreds captured before withdrawing back to Tanzania.  This incident sparked off a purge against the Acholi and Langi soldiers in the UA.
In 1976, the Israeli Army attacked UA's Airbase at Entebbe in a hostage rescue mission leaving several soldiers killed and a number fighter jets destroyed.  By 1978 when the slightly less than 1000 pro-Obote fighters backed by the Tanzanian Army invaded Uganda, the UA had a strength of 20,000 men composed in two brigades of four battalions each, five other specialised battalions, a training regiment, 1000 strong Air wing with twenty-one Mig 21s and ten Mig 17s.
 At the end of the so called Liberation War in Jan 1979, the defeated UA was devastatingly disbanded and vast material resources in form of Human, financial, military equipment, private and public property were destroyed.  A new post Amin Army called Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) was born out of the Tanzania backed Ugandan victorious fighting groups.  The main Pro-Obote, Kikosi Maluum under the Okellos made 95% of the total while Museveni's near briefcase group, FRONASA made less than 5%. 


However, with Museveni as the Minister of Defence, Tito Okello as the Army Commander and Oyite Ojok as the Chief of Staff, the race for numbers between Kikosi Maluum and FRONASA ensued.  By the time of the general elections of December 1980, Museveni initial 80 fighters had swelled to 8,000 while the Okello's KK had swollen to 24,000.  Within that period of less than two years, three sitting Presidents had been overthrown by the army i.e. Iddi Amin, Yusuf Lule and Godfrey Binaisa.
This race for dominance of the political military field culminated into the civil war between the Southern and western Bantu regions and the northern Luo region that was dubbed the NRA Bush War.  In that armed conflict both sides committed heinous crimes against the civilian population but the victorious Museveni's NRA was exonerated.
Had it not been for the Acholi in the UNLA to have overthrown Obote in July 1985, Museveni’s NRA wouldn't have taken over power six months later.  The UNLA was disbanded with thousands of its personnel perishing through exile, detention, summary execution, exile, rebellion and imposed destitution.  For the last 30 years the NRA has been at the helm of domestic politics, foreign policy formulation, agent regional instability, and gross human rights violation.  It has been the biggest consumer of the national wealth by way of Defence taking the lion's share of the national budget with the sole mission of ensuring that Museveni retains political power.

OBSERVATIONS
1.  The army in Uganda has been the major agent of political instability. It has always deviated from its constitutional mandate of safeguarding the territorial integrity of the country. It has always been used by those in power to unleash terror on their political opponents under the guise of assuming the police role of keeping law and order.
2.  The country continues to loose huge resources in unnecessary military expenditures.
3.  Right from attaining independence, the institution of the military lost its national character but instead assumed a sitting regime identity.
4.  Since independence the country has lost its valuable human resource through the use, misuse and abuse of military personnel by successive regimes.
5.  Since independence more Ugandans have lost their and more property and infrastructure destroyed at the hands of the military more than had done by the epidemics and natural calamities respectively.
6.  No country has ever and will never attempt to invade Uganda for territorial annexation or otherwise save for a few instances where such countries are aiding Ugandan dissidents or targeting their dissidents hosted by Uganda.

INFORMATION IS POWER. DEFIANCE IS THE WAY TO GO!

Why Uganda should have only a small ceremonial army - Part 2




Asof 1914 KAR had seventy British Officers, three Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs) and 2,325 African soldiers commonly referred to as Askaris.  The so called coys (companies) were in fact large platoons of 70-80 men instead of the usual 150 men.  Each coy had one machine gun as the only support weapon.  In 1915 the four battalions of the entire East African KAR were expanded to comprise of four companies each thus a total of 1,045 men per battalion.  On 1st May 1917, as these four battalions were elevated to regiments, Uganda's 4th KAR Riffles was also expanded in strength owing to their participation in World War I.

By the end of 1918 when World War I ended, the entire KAR regiments in EA had expanded to 22 Battalions.  Uganda's 4th KAR Regiment had 3rd and 4th Battalions.  However, after the world war, many soldiers were demobilised leaving only six battalions for the entire East Africa.

During the 2nd World War, KAR deployed in the war theatre as 1st and 2nd EA Infantry Brigade and was actively secured the coast of East Africa and some of the men even were deployed as far as Burma.  Upon return these ex-servicemen were instrumental in demanding for self governance.  Iddi Amin had joined the KAR in 1946.  In 1960, the army was deployed in Bugisu and Bukedi districts to quell political violence. 

The clash with rioters saw the army killing 12 civilians, injuring hundreds and arresting more than 1,000 others.  In March 1962, the colonial government the army's growing domestic importance by transferring it to the department of Home Affairs.  On 1st August 1962, the 4th KAR (Ug) based at Jinja barracks was renamed Uganda Army (UA).  Uganda gained independence the following month on 9th October 1962 and inherited the UA as its national army.

As of November 1963 the UA 2nd Battalion was set up with its base in Moroto swelling the strength to 1,500 men.  On 22nd Jan 1964 the UA 1st Battalion at Jinja joined the mutiny that had been started by soldiers in Tanganyika.  The mutineers were demanding for a pay rise and the Africanisation of the officer corps since most of the officers were British.  The mutiny that lasted two days was put down with the help of British soldiers brought in from the Horn of Africa. 

Hundreds of ringleaders were arrested and detained but later on many were released and reinstated while a few were dismissed from military service.  The exorbitant pay rise made the Defence budget to skyrocket by 400@ while the number of officers of Ugandan origin increased from 18 - 55.

Shaban Opolot the Army Commander and his deputy Col. Iddi Amin emerged as the topmost officers.  During the controversial referendum on Lost Counties that fueled the bickering between Mutesa and Obote, the former sent more than 300 ex-KAR servicemen to settle in the area under contention.  This prompted Bunyoro to amasse 3,000 local Banyoro fighters at its border with Buganda ready for a fight but the civil war was averted. 

The government through the army embarked on aiding Congolese rebels who were based in Eastern Congo.  Consequently, Congolese government aircrafts bombed Uganda's West Nile towns of Paidha and Goli.  This adventure also gave rise to the infamous 'Gold Scandal' that sparked off the events that climaxed with the 1966 Crisis.

The government doubled its recruitment drives doubling its size to 4,500 men.  It created 3rd Battalion based at Mubende, a Signal Squadron based at Jinja, and an Anti-Aircraft detachment.  In July 1965 six more units were created - a Brigade Reconnaissance Unit, an Army Ordinance Depot based at Magamaga, a Brigade Signal Squadron Training wing, a Records Office, a Pay and Pensions Office and the UA Workshop.

In February 1966, amidst bickering between the Ceremonial President and Kabaka of Buganda, Edward Mutesa on one hand and the Executive Prime Minister, Milton Obote on the other, the Army Commander Brig. Shaban Opolot was replaced by Col. Iddi Amin.  In May 1966, the UA invaded the Kabaka's palace and flushed him into exile.  Obote suspended the 1962 Independence Constitution and became the Commander in Chief of the UA. 

Brigadier Shaban Opolot was summarily dismissed from the army.  The Army headquarters was moved from Jinja to Kampala setting its base at Buganda Kingdom's Bulange that was renamed Republic House. The government created the General Service Unit initially as a special Paramilitary unit for VIP protection before it assumed the role of intelligence gathering.
As of 1970, the UA strength had swollen to 6,700 men out of which 6,250 men formed the two brigades of two battalions each and an independent infantry battalion. 

The Air Wing consisted of 450 men with 12 fighter jets, seven Mig 15s and 17s.  However, in the same year, the bickering between resident Obote and the Army Chief, Iddi Amin intensified with a recruitment race between the pro Obote Langis and Acholis against Iddi Amin's West Nilers.

INFORMATION IS POWER. DEFIANCE IS THE WAY TO GO!

http://changeofguards.blogspot.ca/2016/12/why-uganda-should-have-only-small_12.html

Why Uganda should have only a small ceremonial army - Part 1




During the pre-colonial era, it is only Buganda and Bunyoro kingdoms that had formidable standing armies.  Bunyoro's Kabalega had transformed his royal guards into a standing army called Abarusura armed with firearms supplied by the Arab slave traders from the coast.

Kabalega's army rivaled that of Buganda that had also been supplied with fire arms by the same Arabs.  It was even composed of a strong naval and under the command of a General.  Around 1869 Egypt’s Khadeiv sent a British explorer, Sir. Samuel Baker to extend his influence on the Nile as far as Bunyoro Kingdom. 

In his expedition, Baker recruited Sudanese mercenaries and set up Forts in northern Uganda but was successfully resisted by Kabalega's army.  With the advent of Western religion, in 1888 religious war erupted in Buganda Kingdom that gave the Muslim Victory over Christians.  This victory was short-lived when an alliance of Protestant and Catholic troops routed the Muslims out once and for all. 

In 1890 the IBEA Co. that administered the territory that would later become Uganda, established an army to defend British economic investments.  The 300 strong force under Capt. Lugard was comprised of Sudanese soldiers recruited from Egypt and came to be known as the British Force in EA (BFEA).  The following year, Salim Bey who commanded the military Unit of the German explorer, Emin Pasha, allowed 100 of his men into BFEA. 

In 1893 a fight erupted between the Protestants and the Catholics but Capt. Lugard of BFEA sided with the Protestants to defeat the Catholics.  In 1894 when the British declared a provisional protectorate over Uganda, the colonial authorities formed a military unit of 600 regulars and 300 Reservists most of whom were Sudanese mercenaries who had formerly been in employment of the Khadeiv of Egypt.  It was put under the command of four Arab speaking British officers and it helped to extend the British influence to other regions of Uganda. 

Earlier in 1893 Col.Colvile had led a force comprised of Baganda and 420 Sudanese mercenaries in a military campaign against Bunyoro and later Acholiland.   These Sudanese mercenaries were to become dominant in the colonial Uganda army whose sole task was to preserve British interests and to carry out punitive actions against those who rebelled against the crown.  

In 1895 the colonial authorities reorganised these soldiers into rifle companies (150 soldiers each) formation and became known as the Uganda Rifles (UR).  In 1897 these Sudanese soldiers mutinied against their British commanders among other reasons, killed the Commander and five other officers. This mutiny that lasted two years was joined by the Muslim community in Uganda, turned violent to all other regions of Uganda and was only suppressed by colonial troops brought in from India. 

To avoid further revolt, the British diminished the composition of the military by reducing the number of Sudanese recruits, increased the ratio of European officers to soldiers and effected a 40% pay rise.  By December 1900, the military expenditure was eroding the profitability of the colonial enterprise.  As a remedy, Special Commissioner, Sir. Harry Johnston organised a low paid constabulary of 1450 armed indigenous Ugandans.

In 1901 the British consolidated all the military forces in East Africa (Uganda, Kenya, Zanzibar) and Somali East Africa under one command and came to be known as Kings African Rifles (KAR).  The two KAR units in Uganda came to be known as the 4th KAR (Uganda) Battalion and the 5th KAR (Uganda) Battalion.  The former was comprised of majority Ugandans and one platoon of Sudanese. 

To maintain racial separation in the military, the Indians were exclusively assigned to the 5th KAR (Uganda) Battalion. In British Somalia was the 6th KAR Battalion, Kenya had the 3rd KAR Battalion while Zanzibar had one company (150 soldiers).  In 1903 the Uganda Constabulary Ordinance and the Uganda Prisons Ordinance separated the Police and Prisons from KAR. 

In the meantime, Uganda's KAR units carried out several punitive military expeditions and armed patrols both inside the country and beyond the borders. In Kenya (1902 - 1906), around L. Kivu in Congo (1909), British Somaliland against Sheikh Abdalar Hassan a.k.a Mad Mullar (1909-10), patrols in Karamoja and Turkanaland in Kenya (1910 - 15).  In 1913 the 5th KAR (Ug) Battalion comprised of exclusively Indians was disbanded thus completely eliminating Indians from Uganda's military services. 

It was instead supplemented with indigenous Ugandans volunteers reserve and Uganda Riffles Corps - both being auxiliary forces that could be deployed to quell domestic disturbances.


INFORMATION IS POWER. DEFIANCE IS THE WAY TO GO!

http://changeofguards.blogspot.ca/2016/12/why-uganda-should-have-only-small.html

Friday, 9 December 2016

Gen. Karekyezi hides from war crimes; will the scapegoat, Brig. Elwelu be court martialled? - #Uganda





".......for us we are small people; agents.  I work on orders; the Commander in Chief (CIC) order.  When you are going to war, the CIC gives you instruments of war.  He gave me an order ......, do I have a choice?  If I don’t do this, he dismisses me, and of course I like my job. The Police Act says that the Minister can at any rime announce that Police has become a military force; it is in the law.  Those who have been saying Kayihura is militarizing the Police, its in the law.

That is just the beginning, have you not seen the plane in the air, I found the Police with SAR (Semi Automatic Rifles) now they have SMG (Sub Machine Gun), they now have AA (Anti Aircraft) guns, am now going
to buy them SabaSaba (Canons), why not?  This is an order from above".

Gen. Kalekyezi at a ceremony in Ntungamo to hand over motorcycles to Crime Preventers - December, 2015.

In the same month the Police in Moroto mounted a Motar in the middle of the road to block people from accessing Dr. Besigye's rally venue before detaining the NTV journalists and smashing their cameras. Mortars are infantry battle support weapons for the military. There is no where in the world where the police use mortars.  It is totally irrelevant to civilian policing.

Earlier on in September 2015, during the pass out ceremony of Police officers at Masindi, the same Gen. Kalekyezi applauded Museveni for supporting the police brutality thus:  "We thank you in a special way for standing up for us at a critical moment when we were under attack".  Months later, during the Urban Authorities Association meeting in Mbarara, Museveni commended Gen. Kalekyezi for the good, thus:  "Kayihura has done a good job; he stopped fujo (chaos); because people wanted to bring fujo to disrupt business".

Last weekend, the revenge attacks by the regime against the Bakonjo people for their overwhelming support for the opposition reached its climax with the cold blooded killing of over 100 men, women and children.  The king's palace was set ablaze, the king arrested, and hundreds of his subjects grossly abused. 
The gruesome incident was ordered by Museveni, overseen by his son Gen. Muhoozi and implemented by the local army Division Commander, Brig. Elwelu.  Because of the ever growing bickering within the security circles, the Army chief, Gen. Katumba Wamala was left out of the venture and the blue eyed Police chief who doesn’t see eye to eye with Gen. Muhoozi kept a distance.  His Assistant IGP and Director of Operations, Asuman Mugenyi was simply incorporated in order to give the attack a police image.

Now that the attack turned out amount to crimes against humanity and is likely to end up at the ICC, Gen. Katumba is disassociating himself from the orders to attack while Gen. Kalekyezi is going deeper into hiding and does not even want to comment.  He is really proving
to be a 'Mufumbira' and a holder of a Masters in Law (LLM).  The burden lies on Brig. Elwelu and AIGP Mugenyi to tell the world from whom they got orders to attack.  We hope the two don’t suffer what befell Gen. Kaziini for being the point man in the eastern Congo
carnage. 

Gen. Kaziini had been the overall Commander of Museveni’s Congo military expedition when war crimes were committed.  His killing by a 'prostitute' provided an opportunity for Museveni to insulate himself against the Congo atrocities if the ICC had opted to go after him.  The only remaining credible witnesses are the convicted
Congolese warlords like Lubanga, Bemba and Ntaganda if they chose to implicate Museveni thus his itching to leave the ICC.


In the instant case, the major question is did Museveni order Brig.Elwelu, iof so, will he court martial him for going against his orders just as a scapegoat, who can effectively pursue this matter in the direction of the ICC?

INFORMATION IS POWER AND DEFIANCE IS THE WAY TO GO.

http://changeofguards.blogspot.ca/2016/12/gen-karekyezi-hides-from-war-crimes.html

Thursday, 8 December 2016

Insight into the "Banyankole" issue - #Uganda - PART 2


Insight into the 'Banyankole' issue

When Museveni took to the bush in 1981, he took with him a number of Biru soldiers and politicians.  The likes of Otafiire, Mushega, Sam Katabarwa, Kategaya, Muntu, Fred Bamwesigye, Chihandae, Aine, Kanyankole, and many others participated in his bush war. 
However, on top of being discriminated, Museveni like has been the case with the Ankole Kingdom army systematically curtailed their domination and influence.  Because of the western front, by the time he captured power in January 1986, the number of Biru in the NRA by far exceeded that of the Bahima in the lower echelons.  This swell in strength of the Biru was the cause of problems for Brig. Tadeo Kanyankole. 
Soon after, the purge of Biru senior officers saw the like of Brig. Bamwesigye, Gen. Maruru, Col. Chihandae, Col. Aine fell victim.  The two top commanders who persisted, Gen. Muntu and Gen. Ivan Koreta were also to have their dose much later.  Also, upon taking over power in 1986 a number of Biru politicians were incorporated into the political wing and the intelligence services.
Several have since time in memorial dominated the positions of District Commissioners, cabinet and parastatal heads.  A good number of them have sustained the mid cadre army command positions and intelligence services (CMI and ISO).   However, there are some no go areas for the Biru i.e. State House and the elite SFC.  Among the top torturers at CMI that is headed by another top Mwiru officer, Brig. Charles Bakahumura, are Biru officers like Col. Mwesigwa, Capt. Joseph Kamusiime, Caleb Kamugisha, Eriphaz Katenesi, Byamukama and a few others.

Museveni refused to reinstate the Ankole Kingdom for fear that he being a commoner would loose influence among the Bahima and to appease the politically strategic majority Biru.  Among the Biru prominent politicians and eminent people associated with Museveni are Kategaya,
Kanyomozi, Bonny Katatumba, Col. Shaban Batariza, Prof. Baryamureba, Kamuntu, Mushega, Otafiire, Basajjabalaba, Rurangaranga, Tiberondwa, Rwakasisi, Matembe, Rukutana, Bitature, Guma Gumisiriza, Bart Katurebe, Kabwegyere, Karoro, Okurut and a few others.  Despite his appeasement policy, the divisions between Biru and Bahima keep deepening.  The Biru who settled into Bahima strongholds in Nyabushozi, Kashari, Ntungamo and Ibanda still face the old discriminatory treatment from their hosts.  Much as they voluntarily help the Bahima with domestic chores for pay, grow crops that they sell to the Bahima and carry out trade in commercial centres, they are still treated as a socially inferior lot.
It is worse during general elections where the Biru in predominantly Hima territories tend to be supporting the opposition and they are brutally disfranchised.  During the last election campaigns, they were caught on camera lamenting to the opposition thus "...... Immediately you leave, they are going to resume beating us".  The situation is further confusing whereby a significant number of police commanders that are brutally defending the regime are Biru officers. 
Just yesterday, the former DPC of Old Kampala, Joram Mwesigye who is undergoing a sham trial for brutally breaking the spine of a Journalist, told court thus:  ".... others turned it tribal, with some people attacking me for being a Munyankole and that we take ourselves to be a superior tribe".  He went ahead to lament that despite his distinguished service to the nation 'they' had paid him through turning against him and prosecuting him.  Asuman Mugyenyi who led the recent massacre of more that 100 Bakonjo people in Kasese is a Mwiru from Shema. 
Of recent Museveni is trying to counter balance the number of Biru in the police by bringing in Bahima and Tutsi from Kisoro.
Like other Ugandans, many majority Biru and the minority Bahima have suffered Museveni's mismanagement.  A few elite Biru and Bahima have sustained the regime though Museveni tends to align more with the later.  A number of Biru have directly borne the brunt of the regime
for their support for the opposition. 

Museveni has tended to align more with the Bahororo from Kebisoni and Buyanja in Rukungiri, most recent the Bafumbira courtesy of Gen. Kayihura and until recently some Bakiga from Kabale.  The current resurgence of Bafumbira is brewing friction with the Bahima over positions in the regime. 

In April 2012, while addressing a regional symposium in Kampala, Museveni dismissed talk of an inherent conflict between Biru and Bahima in Ankole and the existence of a conspiracy for the creation of a Tutsi/Hima empire. For a Muhima, any one who is not a Muhima, Tutsi, Musongora or Mutuku, is a Mwiru. This is what the rest of the country view collectively as
the Banyankole. Therefore, the biggest concentration of political power by Museveni has been around his family, friends, in-laws and a few associates.


INFORMATION IS POWER AND DEFIANCE IS THE WAY TO GO.