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Wednesday, 31 July 2013

WHY MUSEVENI UNDERATES THE ROLE OF NRA'S EXTERNAL WING?

As Museveni was heading for the attack on Kabamba barracks, he despatched a team to Nairobi that came to be known as the External Wing. Innitially it was comprised of Mathew Rukikaire, Amama Mbabazi, Eriya Kategaya, Sam Katabarwa etc. It is this External Wing that negotiated for the merger of Prof. Lule's UFF and Museveni's PRA to give rise to the NRM/A. Later the likes of Bakulu Mpagi, Earnest Kakwano, Sam Male, Kigundu, Dr. Kiseka and a few others came on board to play a major role. Sam Male linked Museveni to Libya's Gadhafi, Bakulu Mpagi took Libyans for a tour of NRA hideouts in Luwero, Kigundu did alot of fundrising for the war. The coming on board of ethinic Baganda on the External Wing helped alot to alley the wide suspicion by Prof. Lule's group of Museveni's treachery. The External Wing did alot of recruitment of fighters, reception and treatment sick and injured fighters, procurement and delivery of arms, diplomatic recognition, propaganda etc. Many Ugandans who were in Nairobi were recruited and and then redirected to the bush in Uganda. Dr. Besigye was recruited from Nairobi. Even those within Uganda found it easy to first move to Nairobi and then be redirected to the bush. Jim Muhwezi and Tinyefuza after being intercepted and escaping from detention had to flee to Nairobi before finding a safer route to passage to the bush. Many of these members had sound financial base and committed alot of personal resources to the cause.

However, Museveni as usual was always worried of the growing influence of the External Wing. To detach them from the fighters, he innitiated harmful propaganda that the External Wing was letting down the fighters by not securing and availing the necessary logistics. As usual he wanted to be viewed as the sole player of every role. He also used it as an excuse to delibarately spend about three quarters of the five years bush war in Europe with his family. Unknown to members of the External Wing, Amama Mbabazi had been planted by Museveni to spy on their activities. That is how some of them like Kategaya and Katabarwa were recalled from the External Wing and grounded in the bush. For the same reasons the contributions of many of them was not recognised after taking over power. Actually, it is believed that Sam Magara (Museveni arch bush rival) met his death in Kampala where had defiantly sneaked from the bush to make contact with the External Wing before he could dislodge Museveni from the Chairmanship of the NRA High Command.

Therefore, external help played a major role in the survival of the NRA. Libya's Gadafi offered training to some fighters and supplied arms more than once. Nigeri's Chief Abiola provided cash. Rwanda's Habyarimana offered a safe passage for supplies and top officials into the NRA liberated zone in the western region. Burundi's Bagaza entered and executed illegal contracts with the NRA that gave rise to the Controvercial Picfare deals.

INFORMATION IS POWER?

WHAT WERE THE DECEPTIVE METHODS THAT THE NRA USED INORDER TO GAIN GROUND IN LUWERO?

After the NRA had targeted and dealt a blow on the Tanzanian army in Uganda, next they targeted the members, local leaders and youth wingers of the UPC party in Luwero. The NRA would kidnap, torture and gruesomely execute these captives. Those who survived capture fled to safe areas like Kampala city. Among the skulls always on display in Luwero Triangle, the remains of these UPC members are included. Museveni and his top military officials have often admitted to killing members of the UPC party.

Special squads of the NRA would dress up in UNLA uniform, attack, kill and loot villages. Shortly after another squad of the same NRA would emerge and pretend to be rescuing the victims by shooting in the air. Then the NRA would advise the unsuspecting villager to move to its hideouts for safety. Once in the hideouts, the males would be enlisted for military training. This gave rise to a number of male under 14 years commonly known as Kadogos enlisting into NRA. The NRA has always argued that these children were orphaned victims of government killings without explaining the whereabouts of the female orphans!

Within the NRA structure there was this dangerous wing called Clandestine. The Clandestine team was based outside Luwero Triange and mostly concentrated in Kampala. It was charged with among others sabotage to tarnish the image of goverment, intelligence gathering, managing safehouses for receiving and despatching fighters to and from the bush, trailing and locating targets that needed to be 'eliminated', receiving and redirecting fresh recruits to the bush, receiving the sick and injured from the bush, 'knocking off' errant members of NRA as was the case with Sam Magara and Sam Katabarwa. In one incident the Clandestine team invited Matayo Kyaligonza's Black Bomber (Urban Hit Squad) to shoot and kill a UNLA Senior Officer at a popular drinking joint at Kisementi. By mistaken identity a DP Member of Parliament (MP) from Tooro, Hon. Bamuturaki was shot dead by Matayo Kyaligonza as the MP excused himself in the urinals of the pub. Ofcourse, as was the then order of the day, the UPC government and the UNLA took the blame. Kyaligonza's Black Bomber caused alot of havoc in Kampala. Those security sweeps in Kampala (panda garis) would always be in response to the actions of the clandestine team and the Black Bomber. Whenever, goverment security agencies would close in on a member of the Clandestine team, he would flee to the bush. A number of them were either arrested, killed or detained. After coming to power, some members of the Clandestine team went into full time military service, others were appointed to public service positions while others were completely sidelined. Notable among the clandestine group was Sserwanga Lwanga, Innocent Bisangwa who hijacked the plane to Kasese in late 1985 and Andrew Lutaya the only civilian during the Kabamba attack. Nsaba Buturo the then District Commissiner of Kampala may have belonged to this team or was a mere NRA contact. The clandestine team still exists under the banner of President's office or State House Intelligence.

There was a Secondary School at Masulita in Luwero. The Headmaster, Jacob Asiimwe was an NRA contact. NRA fighters shared food, domitory and othe amenities with the students at the school. When the government found out, the Headmaster fled to the NRA hideouts together with some of the teenage students. Other students hailing from easily accessible areas were accorded passage by the UNLA. Many male teenagers stright away enlisted for military training. The vulnerable female teenagers mainly hailing from Tooro were turned into sex slaves by NRA commanders. Some fathered babies with these girls in the bush. Many of these innocent girls have died of AIDS. It was a similar situation to when Joseph Kony's LRA took hostage female teenage students of Aboke. A similar fate was suffered by the Katikamu SDA Secondary School where many of the male teenage students ended up being conscripted into the the NRA.

INFORMATION IS POWER.

Monday, 29 July 2013

THE 1985 COUP PROMPTED BY SURRENDER OF UNLA IN FORT PORTAL.

Around that time UNLA suffered setbacks in the western region. A newly posted Brigade Commander (Maj. Agwa) was killed in an NRA ambush at Nyakigumba along the Fort Portal/Kasese Road. Shortly after the NRA overan a UNLA detachement at Rubona Government Stock Farm. Among the weapons the UNlA lost was the multiple barreled Katutsya. Dr. Kagoro Kaijamurubi was the farm manager and was later to join NRA where he attained the rank of Lt before retiring. At the inntiative of Chef Ali, the NRA group in Rwenzori mountain went into negotiations with UNLA's 31st Bn based at Muhoti Barracks. The mediation was led by the then Catholic Bishop Sarapio Magambo of Virika Diocease and comprised of prominient elders fron Tooro (both DP and Former UNLF). Ofcourse Bishop Magambo must have consulted with Cardinal Nsubuga first. UNLA's 31st Bn joined hands with NRA . This news prompted the Okellos to withdraw to Gulu and organise a mutiny. The Commanding Officer Capt Okwera was despatched by Rwigyema and Jim Muhwezi to travel to Gulu via Hoima and Masindi with a special message to the mutineering Okellos.
More details next time.

INFORMATION IS POWER.

Sunday, 28 July 2013

HOW DID THE NRA INITIALLY MANAGE TO ESTABLISH BASES IN LUWERO?

After the elections Museveni remained a free person. He organised the launching of the guerrilla war unhindered. He put in place a network of contacts in the government and security organs. He established a line of supply that was to play a vital role in connecting new entrants to the bush, delivery of essential commodies and medice, and hosting those who would leave the bush to vist Kampala or other areas even outside the country. After the attack on Kabamba on 6th Feb. 1981, the NRA withdrew to Kiboga. The UPC government and the UNLA - the national army was ill prepared for the challenge. President Obote down played the NRA threat as mere bandits. During the first few months, the NRA could even drive vehicles in the area. Museveni used to ride a Vespa motocycle, donned a moslem cap and was refered to as Hajji. It took long before the government deployed troops to track the NRA. During that time, the NRA had ample time to link with simpathisers, local contacts and the external wing. He systematically decided who among his former FRONASAs was to remain in the National army to work from within and those that were to join him in the bush. He got all those Rwandese Tutsi refugees whom he had earlier set aside after they were eliminated from the new post Amin army. He despatched a strong team to estalish an external wing based in Nairobi.

At the time, the country's security was partly manned by the Tanzanian army. The bigger number had been withdrawn back to their country but a significant number manned vital and strategic installations. Museveni would make desparate appeals to Tanzania's Nyerere to withdraw the remaining troops so that he would further disorganise the disorganised UNLA. He use to make these appeals from Sam Njuba's office on Nkuruma Road by calling Nyerere's close confidant, a one Joseph Butiku who is now the Chairman of Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation. Earlier, the first casuality of Museveni's guerrilla war was the Tanzanian Corporal who was manning security at the Quarter Guard during the attack on Kabamba barracks. He was shot by Elly Tumwiine - the lead attacker. Later on, during an attack on Kakiri detachement, Tanzanian soldiers were killed. Museveni always boasts of having watched Paul Kagame blow up a sturbon machine gunner. In another incident, a Tanzanian Major was killed in an NRA ambush. This speeded up the total withdraw of Tanzanian troops from Uganda leaving the NRA to have a free day against the infant UNLA. Museveni very well knew that the UNLA without the backing of Tanzania was easy to infiltrate and disorganise. His innitial estimate had been that most westerners, Baganda and other Bantus would defect and join him so that within a few months he would have overwhelm the UNLA and taken over government. That is why during the early days the NRA was even using vehicles.

When a quick victory proved furtile, he switched to the protracted method including among others allying with other groups to win the support of Baganda. The so called Luwero Triangle was a vast savanaland with thickets. Much of the areas where the NRA established hideouts were forest reserves and innactive huge chunks of land owned by absentee landlords and used by pastrolists commonly known as Lukoola. The area was originally sparsely populated. The inhabitants were mainly Hima and Rwandese pastrolists (Balaalo). These are the people who were later to benefit from the Kanyaryeru resetllement scheme after Museveni took power. These Balalos had mastered the area very well and would act as guides to the NRA. The areas inhabited by Baganda peasants were used as sources of food and hit and run battles with the UNLA. The UNLA on the other hand operated from a strange terrain coupled by a manipulated hostile local population. The hostility arose from UNLA's internal weaknesses coupled by NRA's deceptive methods of operation. If the UPC government and the UNLA had taken on the with the seriousness it deserved, it would not have survived the first two months. Museveni's NRA, yes, Bandits indeed they were and they still are.

INFORMATION IS POWER.





Saturday, 27 July 2013

#Uganda, was #Museveni's bush war a mass uprising?



Not at all. It was just a one-man show driven by his desperate attempt to realise his childhood ambition of becoming president. Ugandans were just recovering from eight years of Iddi Amin's rule. All they wanted was peace and economic recovery. The UPC government was set to settle down and run the government. It had initiated very brilliant programmes in its manifesto many of which years later the Museveni government attempted to implement but was bogged down by corruption. The DP party despite civilised protests that it had been cheated in elections, had accepted to form the opposition. Generally, the country was to move forward.
However, there were already other groups that had resorted to taking up arms. Before the elections, the Gang of Four under the umbrella of UNLF-AD had already set up bases in the Rwenzori mountains to fight against the Military Commission that had overthrown the UNLF arrangement. Museveni's former FRONASA field Commander, Chief Ali was the overall commander. At that time, they had not gone to fight UPC and Obote. Former President under the UNLF arrangement, Prof. Yusuf Lule had resorted to war after being toppled and bared from returning to contest for the Presidency. He too had no grudge against UPC and Obote. He founded the UFF. After the elections, Andrew Kayiira had also founded an armed group called UFM with bases in and around Kampala city. It has never been clear if UFM was affiliated to the DP. Iddi Amin's former finance Minister Moses Ali had also resorted to taking up arms much earlier with bases in Sudan. All these groups viewed Museveni as having been a key architect of the post Amin political chaos.
Museveni moved very fast to suffocate Prof. Lule's efforts by merging with his organisation to form NRM with its military wing the NRA. To hoodwink the Baganda, he made Prof. Lule a figurehead Chairman of NRM and Museveni became the Vice Chairman. Museveni retained the strategic and influential Chairmanship of the NRA High Command. A year earlier as Minister of Defence, he had brutally suppressed a pro-Lule mass uprising. Prof. Lule's Chairmanship would have meant that he becomes the President upon the NRM's assumption of power. Prof. Lule died a few months before NRM came to power and Museveni assumed the Chairmanship of NRM. Ugandans have never debated if Museveni would have allowed Lule to become President! After dealing a blow to Prof. Lule, he moved against Andrew Kayira's UFM. In one incident he agreed with UEM to join hands and carry out a joint operation to attack Lubiri barracks. Museveni's NRA did not show up but the UFM went ahead and attacked. When withdrawing, the UFM was ambushed by the NRA and all the arms taken. Also UFM's Sonko Lutaaya drove and delivered a lorry full of arms to NRA before he also defected. Later, he lured Chef Ali to abandon his bases in the Rwenzori mountain and join him in Luwero. Under the mediation of Libya's Gadhafi, he sought to join hands with Moses Ali's group. That is how James Kaziini came to be the Liaison man between the two groups. With time, he lured and incorporated Vumbula, the Kakooza Mutale group. Another group of David Matovu based in Galilaya Kayunga refused to join him throughout. Here, he was applying the earlier methods he had used in Tanzania during the 1970s; undermining other groups to give shape to his own leadership position.
He chose to fight from Buganda region so that he could resurrect, ferment and exploit the historical differences between Obote and the Baganda. Also, he wanted the justification that he was fighting for the alleged rigged elections which was a DP grievance whose stronghold was Buganda. Above all, the shrewd methods of fighting culminated into the following categories of people who joined hands with him: -
1. The few ambitious individuals who sought a way of landing into positions of power.
2. Rwandese Tutsi refugees looking for an opportunity to invade their country.
3. Unsuspecting Ugandans who were genuinely motivated by the insecurity that Museveni had orchestrated and wanted change.
4. The criminals who were escaping justice.
5. The civilian hostages turned into fighters.
Even so, the NRA remained at less than 5000 between 1981-85 and about 20000 at the time of taking power in 1986. Uganda at the time had a population of about 17 million.

INFORMATION IS POWER.

WAS MUSEVENI JUSTIFIED FOR GOING TO WAR AFTER THE 1980 ELECTIONS?

Throughout the 1980 election campaigns Museveni publicly declared the he would go to the bush if the elections were rigged. Actually, to him the election campaigns was just an opportunity to sound war drums. Immediately after the elections, the situation remained calm. The DP went to court and lodged election petitions. The victorious UPC formed a goverment as the DP formed the opposition in parliament. The top executive of Museveni's UPM met at Kintu Musoke's residence in lungujja, a Kampala suburb under Museveni's chairmanship to discuss the way forward for the party and Uganda. The Executive Committee discussed two issues; whether to go back to the people and build the party or to take up arms and fight the government. Members, except Museveni, unanimously agreed to build the party. Museveni stormed out of the meeting declaring that he had taken the option of armed rebellion. This meeting marked the end of Museveni and UPM's shortlived marriage of convenience. That is why Museveni does not want even to talk about UPM.

The elections had taken place on 10th December 1980. Museveni launched his guerrilla war just a month later by attacking Kabamba Barracks on 6th February 1981. What crimes had the UPC government committed in such a short periord so as to deserve fighting it! Since the conclusion of the election exercise, Museveni had remained a free person in Kampala and the whole country. That is how he managed to take his time to organise and launch his first attack. Driven by guility consciousnes, that is why immediately after every sham election held under his government he heavily deploys the army at all key installations, places opposition leaders either under preventive detention or 24 hour surveillance. He fears they may take off to the bush to start armed rebellion against him.

Having been the leader of a faction (FRONASA) of the national army (UNLA), Minister of Defence and Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, Museveni had made enough preparation for the guerrilla war much earlier. He had mobilised personnel, logistics, intelligence and finance. His claims of having started with 27 men and 21 guns is a hoax. In Kabamba alone, he already had men and arms ready for him to pick. Amama Mbabazi had clandestinely visited the barracks a day earlier for reconnaisance. JJ Odong who was the Intelligence Officer at Kabamba, Tadeo Kanyankole and others who were stationed in the same barracks knew before hand and facilitated the attack. After the attack JJ Odong was arrested and detained in Luzira until in 1985 when he was released after Okello coup. Earlier on Museveni's close Confidant Andrew Lutaaya had delivered arms in Kiboga where the group delibarately withdrew after the Kabamba attack. The local pastrolist population around Kabamba barracks played a big role in reconnaisance. Earlier on Kabamba had been the assembly point for FRONASA aka Red Army during the army reorganisation. Only the 16 guns brought by Julius Chihandae from Gulu barracks where he was the Administrative Officer are always mentioned. What about the arms in possession of Museveni's private army part of which intervened at a roadblock at Kireka!

Thefore by Museveni resorting to war after the 1980 elections, he was trying another gamble at his childhood Presidential ambition.
It had been planned much earlier and no precipitated by the alleged rigging of the 1980 elections.

INFORMATION IS POWER.

Friday, 26 July 2013

WAS THE 1980 ELECTIONS NOT RIGGED?

The DP and UPC who were the major players in the 1980 elections had been founded before Uganda gained independence. To some extent, they had been built on religious foundations i.e Catholicism and Protestantism respectively. The UPC had alot of grassroot support and moreso was seen as the one that had dislodged Iddi Amin. Owing to the events of 1966, its support in Buganda had diminished. However, the 'men in uniform' like Paulo Muwanga, Samwiri Mugwisa and others had played a big role in rebranding UPC in Buganda.
The DP had reasonable support in Buganda and among the Catholics in other parts of Uganda. It had also registered the support of some former UPC members who felt that its UPC and Obote in particular who had cropped up Iddi Amin. Obviously the UPC was set to sweep the entire northern, eastern and a big portion of western regions. The Democratic party had reasonable support in a bigger part of Buganda, the immence catholic presence in Gulu and an equally shared support with UPC in the western region. It is this DP's support among the dominant Catholics in Gulu that was invoked in 1985 for Bazilio Okello to stage a coup against Obote and his UPC. Against that background, no doubt, the little known UPM of Yoweri Museveni and Mayanja Nkangi's CP were just underdogs in the whole tournament.

The 1980 elections were orgnised under the auspice of the Military Commission that was ruling the country at the time. Paulo Muwanga was the Chairman while Yoweri Museveni was the Vice Chairman of that Military commission. Museveni had alot of Confidence in Paulo Muwanga. Earlier, in 1971 he had suggested that Paulo Mwanga should be made the Chaiman of FRONASA. Again in 1985, he secretly met Paulo Mwanga in a German hosipital to work out a coup against Obote. Campaigns were conducted in a secure atmosphere. All the candidates traversed all corners of the country without any hinderence. The security forces apart from providing security, did not expressily demonstrate partician tendencies. It was only during Museveni's campaign rally at Kiryandongo that his bodyguard shot at people and killed one. The other incident involved the murder of a DP parliamentary candidate in Kasese. Under Museveni's Uganda, NRM Cadres and members of the security forces are involved in curtailing the campaign efforts of the opposition, disrupting of opposition campain rallies through deliberate arrests and shooting, multiple voting by soldiers and theirs families, blocking the opposition from accessing the media, distribution of bribes to voters etc.

Shortly after the close of the polls, the DP started announcing the results in its favour. Immagine the DP had a free access to the national radio, an act that would amount to treason/terrorism under the current Museveni rule. When, approached by the External Observer Mission, the DP leader, Paulo Ssemogerere admitted to those announcements as being innacurate and urged his supporters to restrain. This is what prompted Paulo Muwanga the Chairman of the Military Commission to assume the Electoral Commission's role of announcing the final results. No doubt, Museveni who was the Vice Chairman of the Military Commission fully approved the move otherwise he should have protested or at worst relinguished his position.

The UPC and Obote were declared the winners of the elections and the DP accepted to form the opposition. Museveni and his UPM freely and fairly lost in each and every part of Uganda save for one Parliamentary seat in Kasese of Dr. Kiyonga after the prefered DP candidate was murdered eve of the polls. Even in his home village, Museveni was not rigged out by UPC but had misserably lost to DP's Sam Kuteesa. Even the local villagers had errased down his plantation in Kanoni sub county in a show of rejection.
Both the EU Observer Mission and the Commonwealth Team reported thus "This has been a valid election exercise which should broadly reflect the freely expressed choice of the people of Uganda."

Therefore, by comparison, the 1980 election was a much fairer exercise than any of the sham elections conducted under the current 27 years old Museveni regime.

INFORMATION IS POWER.

Thursday, 25 July 2013

WHY WAS MUSEVENI INNITIALY OPPOSED TO THE 1980 ELECTIONS?

During the Moshi conference it had been agreed that general elections would be held within 18 months after the fall of Iddi Amin. During the rule of the Military Commission when the idea was raised, Museveni vehemently opposed it arguing that the country was still undergoing a revolution. Ofcourse, he very well knew that with an election, he would be politically finished. He knew that in an election, the UPC had more chances of wining and then stabilise the country thus quashing his chances of manipulating the military to gain the Presidency.

On 27th May 1980 former President Dr Apollo Milton Obote returned to Uganda ending almost a decade of exile. He landed in Bushenyi the backyard of Museveni's stronghold of Western region. He received a heroe's welcome and that day was to be declared a national heroes day. He returned at a time when the UNLF had been disolved. Most former members of the UNLF had returned to their traditional political parties i.e UPC and DP while others were sitting on the fence. The likes of Prof. Rugumayo, Prof. Dan Wadada Nabudere, Omwony Ojok and Yash Tandon commonly known as The Gang of Four had resorted to armed rebellion under the organisation they called UNLF Anti-Dictatorship. Earlier as Binaisa was topled and placed under house arrest, these four had been summoned to Tanzania, placed under arrest and upon release were banned from returning to Uganda. They had took with them former FRONASA Field Commander, Eriya Mwine aka Sheif Ali who set up bases in the Rwenzori mountains. Obote who had remained the UPC party president no doubt was its flag bearer in forthcoming elections.

The Democratic Party had to select a flag bearer. Former president, Prof. Lule intended to return and vie for the DP presidency but was threatened with arrest by the Military Commission over treasonous allegations. Prof. Lule's popularity was a threat to Museveni's designs. Prof. Lule would have reactivated the nationwide popular structures of the disbanded UNLF and given a real challenge to the UPC. If that would have been the case, what excuse would Museveni have given for resorting to armed rebellion. Paulo Ssemwogerere was picked as DP's flag bearer. Museveni who up to that moment was a member of UPC opportunistically entered into negotiations with DP for his membership but he soon withdrew. The weaker Conservative Party (CP) had Mayanja Nkangi as its flag bearer.

The DP and UPC were the traditional political parties and no doubt general elections in Uganda at the time meant a contest between the two. However there existed a call for a departure from the two tradional parties to a 'third force' ; a new political party. Leading the call were mostly former UPC cadres notably Bidandi Sali, Akena P'Ojok, Ruhakana Rugunda, Matia Kasaija, Buzaabo, Prof Kabwegyere and others. Innitially, it was named Uganda Labour Congress but later it became Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM) with Museveni as its flag bearer. Museveni had urged that because UPC had a leader from the northern region and the DP had a leader from Buganda region, the UPM needed a leades from his Western region. Museveni's selection to lead UPM was protested by a number of founding members led by Prof. Kabwejere to rejoin the DP and UPC. Museveni had approached both the DP and the UPM on the ticket of having been leading a faction of the army (FRONASA) and being the Vice Chairman of the powerful ruling Military Commission thus a counter balance to UPC's military muscle.

Museveni had opposed the 1980 elections because he rightly feared that he would come out of it politically deflated. With love for militaristic approach to public affairs, he does not believe in democratic elections. Indeed those elections delayed his rising to the Presidency through military means.

INFORMATION IS POWER.

HOW DID MUSEVENI UNDERMINE EFFORTS TO BUILD A NEW UGANDA ARMY?

With the birth of Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLF) in Moshi as an umbrella organisation, the different anti-Amin armed groups were also supposed to unite under the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA). After the fall of Iddi Amin, security was manned by the Tanzanian army helped by the UNLA. The UNLA did not have a clearly defined command and control structure. Its two main factions i.e FRONASA and Kikosi Maluum were competing for dominance. Binaisa had made unsuccessful attempts to exert his influence on the army too. On one occasion during the pass out ceremony of Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs) at Nakasongola, while inspecting the parrade he would whisper to individual graduands thus "oli Muganda?" (are you a Muganda?).

Finaly, a grand reorganisation of the UNLA was carried out. Museveni's FRONASA was assembled at Mubende under Lt Fred Rubereza and they called themselves the Red Army. Sheif Ali had relinguished command of FRONASA and taken off with the Gang of Four to start a guerilla war. This reorganisation saw Rwandese Refugees being eliminated from the new national army. Fred Rwigyema and company fell victim but Museveni retained them as a private army. Paul Kagame survived the axe because at that time he was attending a military intelligence course in Arush Tanzania. Still not all Rwandese were eliminated because it was not easy to accurately distinguish between Rwandese Tutsis and Himas. The Army's involvement in the current National Identity Card Project is among other objectives designed to cover up for the same Rwandese Tutsis. Earlier on, UPC leaders in Ankole notably Rwakasisi and Rurangaranga had speaheaded a campaign to discourage Ankole Bairu youths from enlisting into Museveni's private army, FRONASA. These two incidents were a major setback for Museveni's efforts to counter balance Kikosi Maluum.

There had been a nationwide recruitment of Cadet Officers for training in Tanzania. The exercise had attracted quality candidates from all corners of Uganda. The likes of Elly Tumwiine, JJ Odong, Namiti Kagata, Julius Chihandae, Sam Katabarwa, John Kasaija, Clovice Kalyebara, and Many others. This group was to supposed to form the cream of command for the new national army. However, in Tanzania these Cadet trainees were split along the FRONASA and Kikosi Maluum factions of Obote and Museveni respectively. It is a fact that Museveni used to make secret contacts with some of these trainees. The division became visible when the trainees were required to choose a course leader from among themselves. The trainees were split along those for Sam Katabarwa (Museveni's FRONASA) and those for Kagata Namiti (Obote's KM). At the end of the day, Namiti Kagata took the day. This was the first clearer signal that the the stage was being set for a future showdown between Museveni and Obote. It is some of these cadets that Museveni later on used to start the guerilla war. In other security sectors the situation was the same. Some trainees were sent to Cuba for training in intelligence among them Charles Tusiime, the guy who was later to forget a spare tyre when Museveni was launching the guerilla war. The new police force had also attracted quality candidates like Tinyefuza, Jim Muhwezi, Cossy Odomel, Herbert Karugaba and many others but was also faced with the same division. That is why Muhwezi and Tinyefuza later joined Museveni's guerilla war.

All these manoeuvring by Museveni were being dictated by the political situation in the country. His calculation was that he could only achieve his presidential ambition by military means. Therefore his guerilla war was not precipitated by the alleged rigging of the 1980 elections. Instead it was a pre-arranged move.

INFORMATION IS POWER.

Wednesday, 24 July 2013

WHAT ROLE DID MUSEVENI PLAY IN UNDERMINING THE BINAISA GOVERNMENT?

When the NCC returned from Tanzania without President Lule, it convened in State House to select a new President of Uganda. After lengthy deliberations, in the first round of voting Prof. Edward Rugumayo the Chairman of NCC was selected to be the next President. But on techinical grounds ochestrated by Museveni because he feared a strong leader, a second round of voting the same night saw Godfrey Binaisa being selected in absentia as the next President. Museveni in the company of his former GSU handler, Mukombe Mpambara personally drove to go and pick Godfrey Binaisa from a Hotel and delivered him to State House.

Immediately after Binaisa was swon in as the new president, massive violent protests broke out in Kampala demanding for the reinstatement of Prof. Lule (Twagala Lule). Both the Tanzanian Army commanders and Agrey Awori who was Binaisa's Aide urged the President to give orders for the security forces to shoot at the rioters but Binaisa outrightly refused. Instead, Museveni who was the then Minister of Defence went ahead to unleash the army against the protestors. Consequently the protest was contained but having left several dead and hundreds injured. Museveni's current brutal suppression of peaceful dissent should be traced to this incident thus his fear of the people's power.

Binaisa's presidency faced a number of challenges. He had no control of the security forces. He could not make any decision without consulting Tanzania's Nyerere but still through the Tanzania's Resident Minister, Nshekilango. He presided over a goverment split along two major competetors i.e FRONASA/Museveni and Kikosi Maluun/Obote. His two Aides, Agrey Awori and Tumusiime Mutebile were spies working for the Obote and Museveni factions. He iniherited a newly set up communist political and economic structure and was pursuing capitalist programes of free market, democracy and human rights. During the OAU sumit in Liberia, he was denied recognition on grounds that Uganda's independence was questionable owing to its occupation by the Tanzanian Army.

During this time, the military race between Kikosi Maluum and Museveni's FRONASA was heating up. Unlike Lule, Binaisa realised that real power lay with 'the men in uniform' and sought to neutralise them. A new wave of insecurity hit the capital Kampala where there was a series of unexplained murders of prominient personalities. Due to the proliferation of security forces at the time and though Kampala was operationaly under Kikosi Maluum, it was difficult to point a finger at any particular group. Political elites and proffessionals were targeted and in particular Mulago Hosipital Medical Doctors. During the same period when Binaisa left to attend the NAM meeting in Cuba, he left Museveni who was the Minister of Defence as the in-charge of government affairs. In that short period, three Mulago Hospital employees were shot dead and shortly after Jack Barlow and Dr. Abuden Abache were killed. The truth is that it was the work of Museveni's FRONASA aimed at discrediting the Kikosi Maluum and weakening the post Amin government. Museveni had unsuccessfuly argued that Kikosi Maluum leaves Kampala.

Binaisa removed Museveni from the Ministry of Defence to that of Regional Cooperation. He threatened to disband the Military comission for which Museveni was the Vice Chairman arguing that it had outlived its purpose. He urged Tanzania to start withdrawing its troops. He appointed the commander of Kikosi Maluum, David Oyite Ojok as Ambassador to Aligeria. He also planned to bring in an African peace keeping force. The Military commission for which Museveni was the Vice Chairman conspired with the Tanzania army and government and put Binaisa under detention. The country was now ruled by the Military Commission with Museveni as the 2nd most powerful man in the country. Binaisa was only to be released later by Obote during the 2nd UPC government.

INFORMATION IS POWER.

WHAT WAS MUSEVENI'S ROLE IN THE FIRST POST AMIN GOVERNMENT?

As the push to throw out Iddi Amin's government progressed on the frontline, a conference to work out the post Amin government was convened in Moshi, Tanzania. About 28 anti-Amin Ugandan exile groups from all corners of the world converged to draw a roadmap. The most predominant delagation was the pro Obote UPC and the UFU of the Kayiira and Godfrey Binaisa. Museveni led a three man FRONASA delegation. Since around 1972 Museveni had led a campaign to convince Tanzania that Obote was nolonger popular in Uganda and in particular the politicaly strategic cenral region. Some leading Baganda exiles in Britain had successfuly lobbied the British goverment not to support the return of Obote to power. When the socialist leaning Tanzania applied for financial support for the war efforts from Britain, it was given on condition that former President Obote is not to be returned as President. Therefore Obote was kept out of this conference.
During the Moshi conference, a Uganda National Liberation Front was born and Prof. Yusuf Lule was elected as its Chairman. A National Consultatative Council was also put in place as the supreme ruling organ with Prof Edward Rugumayo as its Chairman. A Military Commission Chaired by Paulo Muwanga and Deputised by Museveni was also put in place. The conference had given the position of Vice Chairmanship of the Military Commission to Grace Ibingira but at the Intervention of President Nyerere, Museveni was instead handed the position.

In Uganda, Iddi Amin easily lost power. His army withdrew without causing any damage to the population and public infrustructure. Much of the damage to life and property was done by the bombings by the advancing victorious forces and the looting by members of the public. Unlike Museveni's current Military Officers, Iddi Amin's military officers had not stollen public money to accumulate too much personal wealth that was worthy defending to death. On the contrary, in defence of personal wealth and fear of indictment, if not well planned, Museveni and his top military leaders can only be militarily dislodged after his catastrophic destruction of life and property.

On the 11th April 1979 Prof. Yusuf Lule was sworn in as President of the first post Amin government. He appointed a cabinet in which Museveni took up the position of Minister of Defence. The real power lied with 'the men in military uniform' (Military Commission), the NCC and above all the government of Tanzania through its Military Commanders and the Resident Representative Mr. Shekilango. The men in Uniform were the members of the Military Commission notably Paulo Mwanga and David Oyite Ojok of Kikosi Maluum on one hand and Yoweri Museveni of FRONASA on the other. The two groups were now in a military race to swell their rank and file. Kikosi Maluum was for Milton Obote who had tactically remained in Tanzania at the time. Sandiwitched between these three major players, Prof. Lule, the President was a mere figure head. When he stretched his muscles to resolve a constitutional stalemate, his entire goverment was summoned by President Nyerere to Tanzania to resolve the standoff and he was dropped as President and was never to return to Uganda till he died in exile. This marked the end of his 68 days as President of Uganda. The rest were allowed to return to Uganda with instructions to select another President.

INFORMATION IS POWER.

KANYARYERU- MUSEVENI'S SECTERIANISM ON DISPLAY.

Recently during one of his counter insurgency operations, Museveni visited Kanyaryeru Sub-county to mobilize the war Veterans there.
He arrogantly stated that the war veterans of Kanyaryeru were financialy empowered because they embrassed development projects. He further said that Kanyaryeru sub county was part of the Luwero Triangle that had been transplanted into his home district of Kiruhura. Further more he said that the people Kanyaryeru gave their cows to his NRA during his guerrilla war and he advised them to move away from the war Zone to safer areas.

The truth is that the so called war veterans of Kanyaryeru are the Hima and Rwandese Tutsi pastrolists (Balaalo) who were residing in parts of Luwero during his guerilla war. They helped alot with the preliminary survey or reconnaissance of the area, wellcomed the guerillas, gave them shelter, gathered intelligence etc. No doubt, during the guerilla war the fighters who were predominantly ethinic Ankoles trusted these Balalos more than the Baganda. This is because while there was no Mulalo who could be a member of then ruling Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC), many Baganda were members of UPC . Save for very very few, like Major Herbert Murombe, it war rare to find a Mulalo in the UNLA fighting agains NRA. Many Baganda Commanders like Kiyengo gave Museveni's NRA a blody nose. No Mulalo could be a youth winger but many Baganda youths in Luwero were. Under the patronage of the able UPC Chairman of Luwero, Haji Sebirumbi the youth wingers and the lower UPC party leaders realy gave Museveni's NRA real hard time and were refered to as Bipingamizi. When captured they were summarily executed the Kafuni style. Their skulls and skelletons are also part of those on display by Museveni as victims of killings by Obote's soldiers. As to why its only Haji Sebirumbi who was charged and executed for killings, is a matter for another discussion.

In the Luwero Triangle the Balalo had cows and no anyother tangible property. They used to supply milk and meat to the guerilla fighters.When the situation got worse they handed over their only wealth to the guerillas and in return they were issued with promisory notes. Kahinda Otafiire led the team that received the cows. When the times became tougher they were securely evacuated and protection behind the NRA guerillas. The able bodid men became part of the NRA. That is why there are neither entire families wiped out nor mass graves for Balolos in Luwero.

The Baganda peasants on the other hand owned land, houses, coffee and food crop plantations. Luwero was Kampala's food basket. They were targeted by both the government army and the NRA guerillas. Some were secured by the UPC government and aid agencies while others found their way to safety in Kampala city. They left their food in the farms and domestic animals to be fed on by the NRA without issuance of promisory notes.

Later the NRA guerillas escorted many Balalo civilians out of the Luwero Triangle. When Museveni took over power, one of his earliest success programes was to resettle the Balalos. A huge portion of Lake Mburo National park had to be degazetted to curve out that Kanyaryeru settlement for those Balalos. Others benefited from the Ranches Restructuring Programe. Goverment funds were availed to compesate them for their cows. A modern secondary school named Ngabo Academy was constructed to cater for the education of Balaalo War veterans and Capt Bashaija is the permament Director. Gen. Saleh graduated from this academy. A scholaship fund for the war veterans was set up under state house and managed by Canon Rubunda. Many of the beneficiaries are some of the successful young men you seen in powerful positions in URA, State House, Presidential Guards etc.

For 27 years the Baganda war Veterans of Luwero are yet to be recognised and rehabilitated. Not even the Girls secondary school of Masulita whose girls Museveni guerillas turned into sex slaves has be reconstructed.

Thanks to the current threat of rebellion, Luwero may reep.

INFORMATION IS POWER.

Monday, 22 July 2013

HOW WAS IDDI AMIN FINALLY DISLODGED?

As Tanzania mobilised its forces for a counter attack, Uganda exiles in Tanzania also assembled a force mainly composed of the pro-Obote faction that was named Kikosi Maluum (Task Force). It was under the command of the likes of Tito Okello, David Oyite Ojok, Maruru, Bazilio Okello, Major Rurangaranga, Col. William Omaria, Sam Mugwisa, Paulo Mwanga and others. To steal the show, Museveni also gathered a section of his FRONASA reminants and placed them under the Command of Eriya Mwine aka Sheif Ali. Before departing for the frontline, exiled President Obote addressed and blessed Kikosi Malum. Since Museveni was not a military Commander, he was appointed the overall Political Commissar of the entire Uganda contigent.

Immediately after crossing the border and entering Uganda, Museveni embarked on recruitment to swell his FRONASA. His first target area was the Rwandese Tutsi refugee camps of Nakivale, Orukinga and Nshungyerezi in Mbarara district. The main fighting group composed of both Tanzania army and Kikosi Maluum took the Masaka (central) Axis where actual fighting took place. The Uganda army with Libya's backing put up spirited resistance in areas of Masaka and Lukaya. Museveni knew that Kikosi Maluum was a pro-Obote force and he therefore took the Mbarara (western) axis in order to rise his own army that would in future counter balance Kikosi Maluum. As the fighting was ragging on on the Masaka axis, Museveni was busy carrying out reprisal attacks on Muslims in Masaka and Mbarara, gruesome massacre of Moslems in Itendero, ransacling of Kamukuzi palace and destruction of Kakoba Coffee factory. No such reprisal attacks were recorded in areas controlled by Kikosi Maluum in central, eastern and Northern region. The Ombarch massacre in West Nile took place in an area that was under the control of Museveni even if it was carried out by members of Kikosi Maluum.

Inside Uganda, the Uganda Army conducted the war proffesionally. It adhered to the Geneva convention on armed conflict. It did not attack civilian targets but instead its military police evacuated civilians to safety. Even when withdrawing, the loosing Uganda Army never committed attrocities to the hostile civilians who were jubilating for the advancing victorious forces. The question here is why would the much publcised 'brutal' Uganda army with its 'muderer' commander in Chief, Iddi Amin behave humanely at such a critical moment! The answer is that much of the allegations are for mere propaganda purposes. Much of the regime's human rights violations were committed by the intelligence services. The Uganda army under Iddi Amin remained proffessional but currently under Museveni the military intelligence is the country's lead intelligence agency that guides the regimes politics.

Museveni's efforts to rise a personal army from western Uganda succeeded to some extent. His recruintment theme was 'to break the northern Uganda's dominance of the security services'. He was tactiful in controlling the elistment of recruits by delibarately eliminating the numbers of Ankole Bairus in preference for ethinic Himas and Rwandese Tutsi refugees. That is why John Kazoora was openly turned back by Museveni at Kamukuzi. This how Himas and Tutsis came to dominate leadership in Museveni's current army which he has often defended by arguing that "its because of the western region's historical association with the liberation struggle."

On 11th April 1979 Kampala fell and David Oyite Ojok of Kikosi Maluum made the announcement on Radio Uganda. Iddi Amin fled to Libya. For Museveni, this marked the end of round one of his journey to the Presidency.

INFORMATION IS POWER.

WHAT SPARKED OFF THE INVASION OF AMIN IN 1978?

It is a fact that by 1978 there was no visible armed opposition threat to the Iddi Amin government. However, relations between Iddi Amin and Tanzania's Julius Nyerere remained irrepairably strained. Tanzania remained the base for most of the anti-Amin groups in exile though they were innactive by 1978. Liberation movements had been outlawed in Tanzania in 1977. The East African Community had broken up in 1977. Inside Uganda, the supperb and proffessional intelligence services had made it impossible for any kind of resistance to be organised on Uganda soil. There had been incidents of assasination attempts on Iddi Amin. In one of the incidents, the bullet missed Iddi Amin but hit his driver. In a rare show of extra-ordinary courage, President Iddi Amin reacted by jumping into the driver's seat and driving the injured driver to Mulago national hospital. It is believed that one of the assasination attempts was masterminded by Matayo Kyaligonza. He was later to become one of Museveni's top bush war commanders. To understand this, one needs to examine the history of Museveni's relationship with Kyaligonza. Also, within the Uganda Army, developed some cracks that that threatened rebellious sentiments. They were too minor to cause an impact on a proffessional and highly motivated national army that Iddi Amin had helped to build.

In Tanzania, Museveni maintained clandestine activities against the Iddi Amin government. He had rear bases in the Tanzania's north western region of Kagera bordering with Uganda. There he enjoyed the patronage of local migrant Rwandese Tutsis and Hima pastrolists. It is from here that in 1978 he skillfuly succeded in provoking an incident that led to crossborder clashes. On October 30th 1978, Amin ordered a full scale invasion of Tanzania to reclaim Tanzania's Kagera region. In his book, Sowing the Mustard Seed on page 93, Museveni says "Never since the Amin Coup of 1971 had I felt so bouyant as I did on the day following the invasion. I knew Amin was finished. I remember walking along .......going to consult with Sokoine (Prime Minister) with a complete feeling of complete satisfaction about future course of events." Museveni had provoked antagonism in the hope that Amin would attack and Tanzania would retaliate with a counter attack. Museveni was to use a similar method in fighting a guerilla war agains the Obote government years later. Museveni's political success is attributed to this incident. In recognition, he has built a multi million modern primary school in the area and named it Shule La Msingi Museveni (Museveni Primary School). He also enjoys a special personal attachement to to people of that region driven by ethinic considerations. For the same reasons, the people of Luwero Triangle in Uganda who helped Museveni during the bush war that brought him to power are yet to get tangible recognition 27 years down the road. Museveni gave priority to Kagera region inorder to secure the southern border. Now that the current political situation dictates that he secures Luwero triangle, he has hastly moved in to address their plight.

The Uganda army invaded, overun and occupied the Kagera salient by declaring it to be part of Uganda. It caused alot of havoc and destruction of life and property. On Nov. 2nd 1978, Tanzania announced a counter attack to repel the invading Uganda army.

INFORMATION IS POWER.

Sunday, 21 July 2013

WHY AND HOW DID MUSEVENI UNDERMINE OTHER ANTI-AMIN GROUPS?

Both the foiled coup attempt and the defeated open crossborder invasion of 1972 coupled by gruesome events that followed thereafter, made Iddi Amin to repressively strengthen his grip on power. The purge of the suspected rebelious Acholi and Langi soldiers led to desertions that helped to swell the rank and file of the main anti-Amin but pro-Obote group of fighters in Tanzania. Museveni who ran a parallel briefcase group had cause to wory. Most of his own recruits had either been disbanded, deserted or joined other groups. The very few who had remained around him like Sheif Ali, Ivan, Koreta, Salim Saleh, Fred Rwigyema and a few others were not worthy being called a force but a squad in military terms. This squad had undergone some military training in southern Tanzania region alongside Mozambique's independence freedom fighters. Within FRONASA, Museveni was faced with allegations of masterminding the mysterious deaths of some founding membess among others Martin Mwesiga and Raiti Omongin. It is most likely that he eliminated his coleagues in order to secure his future leadership position. Martin Mwesiga was a lawyer and a member of the Ankole royal family which Museveni dissents so much. This is what made another Ankole royal family member, Sam Magala to abandon him and defiantly ran to Obote in Daressalaam for help with education. The likes of Saleh, Koreta, Rwigyema, Sheif Ali who stuck to Museveni missed out on education. However, many years later Sam Magara was made to pay by blood for this defiance.
During the same period, the top political leadership of FRONASA disintergrated due to Museveni's intrigue.

Museveni joined several other anti-Amin groups. But generally, Museveni's intrigues made other groups to suspect that he was an Iddi Amin agent. On several occasions he would be detained by Tanzania's security officials but would be released at the intervention of President Nyerere. Museveni enjoyed cordial relatinship with Nyerere based on strong marxist leanings.

The truith is that Museveni was not an agent of the Iddi Amin government. Driven by Presidential ambitions, he did not wish to see other groups making success thus undermined their efforts. One of the methods he used was to ensure that he kept informed of all their activities. When he couldnt frustrate such efforts through misinformation, then he would indirectly leak such information to the Iddi Amin security apparatus. An anonymous tel call or an anonymous written report by post would serve the purpose. The best example is the discovery of arms in the Anglican Archi-Bishop's custody and his subsequent murder in 1977. The plain truith is that the consignment of arms had been smuggled into the country by the pro-Obote group using the Anglican Church. 'Someone' had alerted Amin's intelligence network and the consignment was intercepted leading to the Archi-Bishop's subsequent murder.

As of 1977, liberation movements had bee outlawed in Tanzania. Museveni later took up a teaching post in the northern town of Moshi but he maintained clandestine hit squads inside Uganda coordinated by the Nairobi based team composed of Otafire, Amama Mbabazi and a few others. The fighters belonging to the main group of Milton Obote languished in Kigwa refugee settlement camp in Tabora. In Uganda the economic situation was appaling. The scale of murders, kidnapping and disappearances had subsided abit. Above all, by 1978 there was visible formidable group posing a threat to Iddi Amin regime.

INFORMATION IS POWER.

HOW DID MUSEVENI CONTRIBUTE TO IDDI AMINI'S BRUTALITY

After his Sept. 1972 failed hasty invasion, Museveni desperately intensified his clandestine hit squads inside Amin's Uganda. In Jan. 1973, Amin's security services captured some members of such hit squads who had been infiltrated into the country. Their network was busted the captives summarily tried by a military tribunal headed by Col. Ozoo and found guilty and sentenced to death on 23rd Jan. 1973.
The evidence against them was overwhelming following the defection of some two recruits from a newly set up camp in the Bunya forest in Busoga region. The following day on 24th Jan. 1973, they were publicly executed by firing squad in their respective home areas. Among them was Capt. Masaba, Joseph Bitwari, James Karambi, and Pheres Kasoro.
On 30th Jan. 1973 a one Abwooli Malibo from Tooro was arrested in Kampala in possession of a pistol and he confessed that he had been sent to kidnap and assassinate key targets in the Amin government. Also, from the northern region Amos Obwona and John Labeja were found in possession of five assault rifles and were given the same treatment. These ones may have belonged to the Oyite Ojok clandestine group.
Back in Tanzania, it had by then become clearer that Museveni intended to run parallel efforts to ouster Iddi Amin. The main group was that of former President Milton Obote which comprised of senior army officers. Museveni intensified clandestine acts of sabotage inside Uganda and against exile groups.
This is confirmed by Museveni's self confession of deliberate destabilisation thus "it was following these encounters that ......and some of the most prominent members of Amin's government fled into exile." These were top government officials like Prof Dan Nabudere, Prof Banage, Prof Rugumayo, Prince Elizabeth Bagaaya etc.
Inside Uganda, the Amin regime was thrown into confusion and Iddi Amin now behaved like a wounded buffalo. Suspicion and mistrust took centre stage as is the situation in Museveni's Uganda now. With some key figures in his cabinet fleeing into exile, Iddi Amin filled cabinet positions with military officers and top positions in the army and intelligence services were dominated by his ethnic west Nilers of Sudanic origin.
However, some performed very well i.e. Brig. Barnabas Killi the Minister of Education oversaw a flourishing education standard in the country that is yet to be witnessed again. In support of the Palestinian cause, Iddi Amin expelled the Israelis and ceased relations and later he expelled the Asians.
Arrests, torture, murders, kidnapping, forced disappearances and detention without trial became the order of the day. Some of these murders, kidnappings and disappearances of prominent personalities have never been satisfactorily explained. The fact is that both the Iddi Amin regime and the groups fighting him contributed. A Nairobi based Museveni close confidant, Wycliffe Kazoora sent a group from Nairobi armed with a pistol and good amount of cash with instructions to assassinate prominent personalities but were intercepted by Amin's security agents.
Another FRONASA operative Chris Nyombi was intercepted at Malaba border post with heeps of anti-Amin propaganda pamphlets enroute from Nairobi. Museveni's Nairobi station managers were Amama Mbabazi, Otafiire and Wycliffe Kazoora. Such pamphlets would either be posted to specific addresses or slotted into offices of prominent people with the sole aim of putting the targets into Iddi Amin's direct line of fire.
A one Peter Owili of Obote's group posed as a member of Amin's State Research Bureau and kidnapped the Central Bank Governor Joseph Mubiru. In Sept 1972 both Michael Kabali Kagwa and Ben Kiwanuka the President of Uganda Industrial Court and the Chief Justice respectively disappeared without trace. Around the same time, such incidents led to leading personalities to flee Uganda.
It is because of the contribution of the Anti-Amin groups (Museveni in particular) in these murders, that no single member of Iddi Amin’s intelligence services has ever been made to answer.

INFORMATION IS POWER.

WHAT PROVOKED IDDI AMIN TO BECOME BRUTAL?

The new regime of Iddi Amin had initially been embraced by Ugandans and the international community. Iddi Amin made a cabinet line up composed of the best brains Uganda has ever had. The likes of Prof. Rugumayo, Prof. Banage, Wanume Kibedi, Princes Elizabeth Bagaaya, Grace Ibingira, Godfrey Binaisa and several others of that calibre were Amin's top government officials.
The strategic Buganda region had embraced Iddi Amin more especially after he arranged for the return of the remains of their king the Kabaka and according it a descent burial. Of course its the same Iddi Amin then a Colonel who had commanded the assault on king's palace leading to the king's exile where he died. Of course, Col. Iddi Amin as an Army officer was implementing the Commander in Chief (President Obote)'s orders.
Similarly, recently Gen. Tinyefuza pleaded superior orders for having masterminded the raid on High Court. Cabinet promoted Iddi Amin to the rank of General and appointed him President. Godfrey Binaisa publicly stated that Iddi Amin had overthrown Obote because the former loved Uganda.
Uganda's Ambassador to UN, Grace Ibingira wrote an article attacking Tanzania's Nyerere for giving sanctuary to deposed President Obote. Foreign Affairs Minister, Prince Elizabeth Bagaya urged the exiled former President Obote to return home because "the country was developing at a supersonic speed".
No doubt the Iddi Amin government was set to lead the country to stability and prosperity. However, this was not good news to those in exile who were bent on dislodging the new Iddi Amin government. All efforts were made to destabilise and tarnish the image of the Iddi Amin government by groups in exile.
Museveni and Oyite Ojok opened up clandestine subversive guerrilla cells inside Uganda. Driven by ambition, Museveni managed to convince Tanzania's President Nyerere that inside Uganda existed a general feeling of dissent against Iddi Amin such that a slight external invasion would trigger an internal uprising that would dislodge the regime.
President Nyerere blessed and facilitated an open day invasion of Uganda on 17th September 1972. After overrunning the Uganda border, the invaders split into two columns - the Okello column headed for Masaka while the Museveni one made up of five trucks headed for Mbarara. Within a few hours, the Uganda Army had overwhelmingly defeated the invaders on the two fronts.
Many of the invaders were either killed, captured and the remaining fled back to Tanzania. Worthy noting is the fact that ordinary civilians helped a lot in capturing and lynching the disarrayed invaders. Civilians in these areas paid heavily eight years later 1978/79 when Museveni carried out reprisal attacks during the full scale invasion that ousted Iddi Amin.
The whole venture had been ill prepared and unnecessary but was driven by Museveni's over ambitiousness. This incident and other acts of sabotage that followed made Iddi Amin to behave like a wounded buffalo.

INFORMATION IS POWER.

Friday, 19 July 2013

DIDNT MUSEVENI'S FRONASA FIGHT AND OVERTHROW IDDI AMIN?

Though Museveni was a member of Obote's UPC, in Tanzania he enjoyed the privillege of having attracted the attention of Mwalimu Nyerere during his sudent days at Daressalaam university. With this privillege he ran parallel efforts to ouster Iddi Amin. In February 1971 together with other exilees they formed the Temporary Committee. In March it was changed to the Committee of Seven having been formed by seven people among them Zubairi Bakari with whom they had been together in the intelligence services (GSU). In July it became Front For National Salivation (FRONASA). The top leadership of FRONASA was composed of Mukombe Mpambara as the Chairman, Yoga Adhola as the Secretary for Publicity, Jack Maumbe Mukwana as the Secretary for Mobilisation, Eriya Kategaya as the Secretary for Finance and Yoweri Museveni as the Secretary for Defence.

It in this capacity that he opened up clandestine cells inside Uganda for carrying out acts of sabotage aimed at tarnishing the image of the Iddi Amin government. Later, in 1980 Museveni confenssed thus "During this period we however caused alot of destabilisation as far as Amin government was concerned. It was following these encounters that ........some of the most prominent members of Amin's government fled into exile." While the Obote faction under the patronage of UPC had a free hand in recruiting fighters from all corners of the country, little known Museveni could only ally with those from his home area in the western region, and a few others from the eastern region courtesy of the likes of Raiti Omongin, Jack Maumbe Mukwana, Yoga Adhola and a few others. As Secretary for Mobilisation, Maumbe Mukwana recruited quite a number of young men from Bugisu for military training in Tanzania. However, Museveni undermined these boys by branding them lumpens in preference for his home boys, the likes of Saleh, Ivan Koreta, Sheif Ali, Fred Rwigyema, Sam Magara and a few others. This was a deliberate move by Museveni to raise a personal army to outwit the main exile force of former President Obote and the beggining of the North/South divide.

Despite all those manoeuvres, FRONASA never took root and by 1974 it had allmost died out. Some of its founding members like Eriya Kategaya had left for the USA. The remaining few FRONASA fighters were stuck in Tanzania. Sam Magara ran to Milton Obote who helped him to take a law degreet at the University of Daressalaam. Several other anti-Amin groups sprung up. Andrew Kayiira, Olara Otunu and Godfrey Binaisa founded the UFU based in the USA. Yusuf Lule and Martin Aliker founded the Uganda Society based in Nairobi. Eteker Ejalu founded the Save Uganda Movement. Prince John Barigye formed the UNM in 1976 based in Lusaka Zambia. The likes of Sekasi and Nyombi formed the PLP based in Nairobi. Museveni in person joined the last two above where in each case he would opportunistically secured for himself the Defence fortfolio.

However, Museveni maintained separate links with clandestine hit squads inside Uganda coordinated by the likes of Amama Mbabazi, Otafiire and a few others with funding from Wyclife Kazoora. At the time of the invasion from Tanzania in 1978, FRONASA was just on paper. After the liberation forces(both TPDF and Kikosi Maluum) had crossed the border and were battling Amin in Buganda areas, Museveni was busy recruiting fron the Rwandese Refugee camps and his home area to put in place what came to identified as FRONASA during the post Amin period. During the Moshi conference shortly before the fall of Iddi Amin, FRONASA was represented by only Museveni, Late Fred Rubereza and another little known person.

INFORMATION IS POWER.

DIDNT MUSEVENI SAVE UGANDANS BY REMOVING IDDI AMIN?

Museveni opposed Iddi Amin but he also significantly contributed to make Iddi Amin the manace that he became. Iddi Amin overthrew President Milton Obote in a military coup in 1971. Obote's overthrow was backed by the west because he had demonstrated communist leanings more especially by openly opposing Apatheid. Tanzania and President Nyerere in particular refused to recognise the new Iddi Amin government. Former President Obote was offered sanctuary in Tanzania as a state guest together with a number of his top goverment and senior military officials. With the backing of Tanzania, efforts to militarily dislodge the Iddi Amin government and reinstate Milton Obote to power were immediately commenced.

A pro-Obote fighters camp was set up at Owiny Kibul in Southern Sudan. Lured by Senior Acholi and Langi army officers like Tito Okello, Oyite Ojok and others who had fled with Obote to Tanzania, some members of the Uganda army and civilian recruits started escaping to Tanzania and Sudan. In one incident 417 recruits destined for the Owiny Kibul camp were intercepted at Ajoech Corner by Iddi Amin's agents assisted by fighters of southern Sudan's Gen. Joseph Lagu's Anyanya movement and massacred. They were mostly Acholis and Langis. Within the Uganda army the purge of Acholis and Langis intensfied more especially after the aborted coup and the foiled open invasion from Tanzania during 1972.

Among the exiled Ugandans in Tanzania, was a little known young and ambitious man called Museveni. He had immediately after university education enilisted (with the help of Mukombe Mpambara) into the first Obote government's intelligence services under the Presidents Office. At the time of the Iddi Amin coup, he was such a junior staff that the new Iddi Amin regime would not have persecuted him into exile. Driven by childhood Presidential ambitions, Museveni voluntarily went to Tanzania to pursue his dream. Museveni did not innitiate a single meaningful anti-Amin group but opportunistically kept moving his membership from one group to another in seach of top leadership positions but also for other sinister motives. Actually, at a certain stage it was widely suspected by the exiled community that Museveni was an Iddi Amin spy. However, he maintained notorius clandestine hit squads inside Uganda that were responsible for alot of myhem that were attributed to the Iddi Amin regime.

In 1979, Iddi Amin was overthrown by the pro-Obote armed group called Kikosi Maluum (Task Force) under the able command of the likes of Oyite Ojok, Tito Okello, Zed Maruru, William Omaria and many others with the backing of the Tanzania army. Museveni was the overall political commissar of the group.
Therefore, its Obote who with the backing of Tanzania fought his way back to regain his presidency.

INFORMATION IS POWER.

DID MUSEVENI SACRIFICE TO LIBERATE UGANDA?

Absolutely NO. He has never devoted even a minute of his life Uganda. First of all, liberating Uganda from what! Right from his childhood, he harboured ambitions of becoming President of Uganda. All his political undertakings were geered towards the fulfilment of this ambition. During his school days he belonged to the strong students movement with marxist leanings. This earned him the attention of Tanzania's Julius Nyerere who helped him alot to claimb the leadership lader.

Museveni significantly contributed to caose that Uganda has witnessed. He only skilfully turned around and sought to address this caose in what he brands as struggling to liberate Uganda. Unfortunately, in the course of those manoeuvres he enlisted the few unsuspecting but significant Ugandans who joined hands with him.

Having attained the Presidency, he has spent the 27 doing nothing else other than manoeuvring to retain power. Unfortunately, he successfuly hoodwinked the whole world except a few Ugandans who know his treacherous survival games and have attempted to oppose them. He has always brutally suppressed them while branding them opportunists, reactionaries, negative forces and the new found trademark - terrorists.
As to why he so desparately wanted to become President, the answer lies in what is presently happening in Uganda and the region.

INFORMATION IS POWER.

Thursday, 18 July 2013

WHY MUSEVENI NEGLECTS HIS WAR VETERANS; UNLIKE MUGABE


Unlike Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe, Museveni neglected the people of former Luwero Triangle and the war veterans who helped him alot during the guerrilla war that brought him to power.

Museveni delibarately neglected these areas and the war Veterans so that it serves as a measure to deter and discourage others who may have intentions of venturing into supporting a similar armed rebellion against him. In that way, the loss of lives and destruction of Luwero Triangle's economic base during the war 27 years ago, the total neglect of war veterans and the general appalling poverty levels in that region sends a clear message that you support rebellion at your own peril.

For similar reasons, during the insurgency in the northern Uganda region, its economic base was delibarately dismantled. There is no doubt the people of northern Uganda rejected Museveni's governance right from the start and therefore rebelled or supported the insurgency. The northern Uganda reconstruction plan was designed just to attract donor money. No wonder, that money has been wantonly stollen under the supervision of the Prime Minister.

To Museveni, a successful rehabilitation and reconstruction of northern Uganda would amount to rewarding the area for having supported the insurgency.  I wonder how the UPC government would have treated Luwero triangle had it managed to defeat Museveni's rebellion in the early 80s!

However, Museveni is now faced with a potential threat of armed rebellion with bases in Buganda region. He knows very well that having suffocated all civilised ways of expressing dissent the situation is ripe for armed rebellion. More so, he knows that Ugandans now understand than ever before that he has always taken them for a ride. He has hastly pitched camp in Luwero under the guise of fighting poverty. He has demarcated the area into zones and assigned his senior army officers as zonal leaders under the overall command of his top most General and brother.

In military terms, this is a purely counter insurgency operation meant to win back the local support and deny the enemy ground. No doubt, even the funding for this operation will indirectly come from the Ministry of Defence budget. The recent appointment of Gen. Katumba - a Muganda as head of the Army also alludes to these desperate efforts.

Unfortunately, the major problem of oppressed Ugandans is failure to understand Museveni's manipulative ways.

INFORMATION IS POWER.